I had a conversation with Bryan Cross of Called to Communion the other day here. In our conversation I was pressing the imposibility of participation in God on the Scholastic view of God. Cross replied:

“[Post 48]Yes, we participate in all of God (not a part of God), but that doesn’t entail that we grasp all of God or fully comprehend God. Just as the fullness of the object grasped is not equivalent to fully grasping the object, so participation in the all of God is not equivalent to fully grasping God. In the Supplement of the Summawe read, “The created intellect sees the Divine essence not according to the mode of that same essence, but according to its own mode which is finite.” (Q. 93, article 3)…[Post 55] Your objection is that if God is simple, then it is impossible for a person who participates in God, not to fully grasp God. But, as I already explained, that conclusion does not follow, because comprehension is a relational activity, and therefore the matter of degree can be on the subjective side of the relation; it need not be on the objective side of the relation. And therefore there can be degrees of participation even in that which is simple.”

It took me a couple days to translate what that meant. In Three Types of Religious Philosophy (The Trinity Foundation: Jefferson, Maryland, 1989)Dr. Clark gives an exposition of Aquinas’ view of knowledge and its comprehension of God.  Clark says,

“Aristotle had noted that an adjective or predicate, attached to two different subjects, does not always have precisely the same meaning. For example, the adjective medical does not mean exactly the same thing when one says, ‘this man is a medical man,’ as it means when one says, ‘this book is a medical book.’ There is, however, a relationship between them, in that in one way or another they both refer to the science of medicine. This relationship is called analogy. The two meanings of the term are analogical.” (pg. 62)

This is what Cross means.    So by different modes or two sides of a relational activity, what Cross and Aquinas mean is that the comprehension on the human side is analogical to the reality on the divine side. Now I am on ground that I am familiar with. The analogical and univocal predication issue is one that real Clarkians  “know like the back of their hand.”   It is a difficult thing debating with people sometimes. Someone could be using a concept that you have read thousands of pages on but if he does not use a tag that you are familiar with he can confuse you.  This theology business is difficult indeed.

In Aquinas’s article in the Summa, “Whether the human intellect can attain to the vision of God in His essence?” he says,

“Objection 1: It would seem that the human intellect cannot attain to the vision of God in His essence. For it is written (Jn. 1:18): “No man hath seen God at any time”; and Chrysostom in his commentary says (Hom. xiv in Joan.) that “not even the heavenly essences, namely the Cherubim and Seraphim, have ever been able to see Him as He is.” Now, only equality with the angels is promised to men (Mat. 22:30): “They . . . shall be as the angels of God in heaven.” Therefore neither will the saints in heaven see God in His essence.”…

[Aquinas says] “Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted can be explained in three ways, according to Augustine (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). In one way as excluding corporeal vision, whereby no one ever saw or will see God in His essence; secondly, as excluding intellectual vision of God in His essence from those who dwell in this mortal flesh; thirdly, as excluding the vision of comprehension from a created intellect. It is thus that Chrysostom understands the saying wherefore he adds: “By seeing, the evangelist means a most clear perception, and such a comprehension as the Father has of the Son.” This also is the meaning of the evangelist, since he adds: “The Only-begotten Son Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him”: his intention being to prove the Son to be God from His comprehending God.”

“Reply to Objection 2: Just as God, by His infinite essence, surpasses all existing things which have a determinate being, so His knowledge, whereby He knows, is above all knowledge. Wherefore as our knowledge is to our created essence, so is the Divine knowledge to His infinite essence. Now two things contribute to knowledge, to wit, the knower and the thing known. Again, the vision whereby we shall see God in His essence is the same whereby God sees Himself, as regards that whereby He is seen, because as He sees Himself in His essence so shall we also see Him. But as regards the knower there is the difference that is between the Divine intellect and ours. Now in the order of knowledge the object known follows the form by which we know, since by the form of a stone we see a stone: whereas the efficacy of knowledge follows the power of the knower: thus he who has stronger sight sees more clearly. Consequently in that vision we shall see the same thing that God sees, namely His essence, but not so effectively.”

“Reply to Objection 3: Dionysius is speaking there of the knowledge whereby wayfarers know God by a created form, whereby our intellect is informed so as to see God. But as Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii), “God evades every form of our intellect,” because whatever form our intellect conceive, that form is out of proportion to the Divine essence. Hence He cannot be fathomed by our intellect: but our most perfect knowledge of Him as wayfarers is to know that He is above all that our intellect can conceive, and thus we are united to Him as to something unknown. In heaven, however, we shall see Him by a form which is His essence, and we shall be united to Him as to something known.”

“Reply to Objection 4: God is light (Jn. 1:9). Now illumination is the impression of light on an illuminated object. And since the Divine essence is of a different mode from any likeness thereof impressed on the intellect, he (Dionysius) says that the “Divine darkness is impervious to all illumination,” because, to wit, the Divine essence, which he calls “darkness” on account of its surpassing brightness, remains undemonstrated by the impression on our intellect, and consequently is “hidden from all knowledge.” Therefore if anyone in seeing God conceives something in his mind, this is not God but one of God’s effects.”

From my reading of Aquinas this is a created effect. Yet in his article Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God? he says,

“Reply to Objection 2: This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God.”

So then seeing God, as intellectual comprehending him, cannot be seeing God but his effects.  However, at the same time, in intellectual seeing God/comprehending him, it is not a similitude but God. Maybe Aquinas is confused. I think so. 

[Continuing with: Whether the human intellect can attain to the vision of God in His essence?]

“Reply to Objection 5: Although the glory of God surpasses any form by which our intellect is informed now, it does not surpass the Divine essence, which will be the form of our intellect in heaven: and therefore although it is invisible now, it will be visible then.”

So then God is not powerful enough to make himself known to us? And whatever happened to being made in the IMAGE of God? 1 Cor 11:7 For a man ought not to have his head covered, since he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of man. Is Paul talking about heaven? No, a man NOW should not cover his head, because NOW he is the image and glory of God. Aquinas says “the glory of God surpasses any form by which our intellect is informed now” Paul says, “he is the image and glory of God” NOW. Which is right?

“In this sense nothing hinders our intellect, although finite, being described as proportionate to the vision of the Divine essence; but not to the comprehension thereof, on account of its immensity.”

So what is the difference between the vision and the comprehension? Two sides of a relationship called analogy. Don’t let him confuse you. These Thomists will cry at the top of their lungs that they have real participation in God but it is a deception. Analogy gives no real knowledge of God. See my article Univocal Predication vs. Nonsense. This last statement by Aquinas leads me to another quote by Clark:

“Thomas developed the theory of analogy far beyond the simple observation of Aristotle, and it took on major proportions when the subject was God. Thomas held that the simplicity of the divine being required God’s existence to be identical with his essence. This is not the case with a book or pencil. That a book is and what a book is are two different matters. But with God existence and essence are identical. For this reason an adjective predicated of God and the same adjective predicated of man are not univocal in meaning. One may say, God is good, and one may say, This man is good; but the predicate has two different meanings. There is no term, not a single one, that can be predicated univocally of God and of anything else.” Three Types of Religious Philosophy (The Trinity Foundation: Jefferson, Maryland, 1989), pg. 63

Once again, Dr. Clark shows his incompatibility with the doctrine of Divine Simplicity. When will contemporary Scripturalists admit it? When will they admit that this doctrine is at the basis of the Western medievel doctrine of the Filioque? When will they have the logic, the consistency and the guts to reject it?