The idea of social covenant theory a.k.a. the Protestant Establishment Principle is found in Samuel Rutherford’s Lex Rex Q. XIV and is explained and defended in full in his book Free Disputation. As was quoted above, “Civil magistracy is recognized and acknowledged to be “the ordinance of God” and “the minister of God to thee for good” not only by means of institution (i.e. meeting the qualifications for civil magistracy as found in God’s moral law in nature and in Scripture), but also by means of constitution [Ergo, Nero had right of institution but not of constitution and therefore is not recognized as the ordinance of God —DS] (i.e. securing the consent of the people and being invested with power by means of a covenant [whether explicit or implicit] between the magistrate and the people).” [GP] [Deut 17:14,15, Jud 8:22, Judg 9:6, Judg 11:11, 1 Sam 11:15, 12:25, 1 Chron 11:3, 12:38, 2 Sam16:18, 1 Kings 1:38-39, 16:16, 2 Kings 10:5, 11:17-18, 14:21, 2 Chron 23:3, Judg 8:22, 9:6 Ecc 8:2, {Freedom of parties to release themselves from covenant obligations when the terms if the covenant are broken-Jos 2:17-20}—DS]. You never see this with the office of a prophet. They are always called immediately by God. You never read hw the people made someone a prophet.
The Westminster Confession Chapter 23 states,
XI. Civil magistrates may not assume to themselves the administration of the Word and sacraments; or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven;[5]yet he has authority, and it is his duty, to take order that unity and peace be preserved in the Church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administrated, and observed.[6] For the better effecting whereof, he has power to call synods, to be present at them and to provide that whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God.[7] [5] 2CH 26:18 And they withstood Uzziah the king, and said unto him, It appertaineth not unto thee, Uzziah, to burn incense unto the Lord, but to the priests the sons of Aaron, that are consecrated to burn incense: go out of the sanctuary; for thou hast trespassed; neither shall it be for thine honour from the Lord God. MAT 18:17 And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. MAT 16:19 And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven. 1CO 12:28 And God hath set some in the church, first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then gifts of healings, helps, governments, diversities of tongues. 29 Are all apostles? are all prophets? are all teachers? are all workers of miracles? EPH 4:11 And he gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers; 12 For the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ. 1CO 4:1 Let a man so account of us, as of the ministers of Christ, and stewards of the mysteries of God. 2 Moreover it is required in stewards, that a man be found faithful. ROM 10:15 And how shall they preach, except they be sent? as it is written, How beautiful are the feet of them that preach the gospel of peace, and bring glad tidings of good things! HEB 5:4 And no man taketh this honour unto himself, but he that is called of God, as was Aaron. [6] ISA 49:23 And kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their queens thy nursing mothers: they shall bow down to thee with their face toward the earth, and lick up the dust of thy feet; and thou shalt know that I am the Lord: for they shall not be ashamed that wait for me. PSA 122:9 Because of the house of the Lord our God I will seek thy good. EZR 7:23 Whatsoever is commanded by the God of heaven, let it be diligently done for the house of the God of heaven: for why should there be wrath against the realm of the king and his sons? 25 And thou, Ezra, after the wisdom of thy God, that is in thine hand, set magistrates and judges, which may judge all the people that are beyond the river, all such as know the laws of thy God; and teach ye them that know them not. 26 And whosoever will not do the law of thy God, and the law of the king, let judgment be executed speedily upon him, whether it be unto death, or to banishment, or to confiscation of goods, or to imprisonment. 27 Blessed be the Lord God of our fathers, which hath put such a thing as this in the king’s heart, to beautify the house of the Lord which is in Jerusalem: 28 And hath extended mercy unto me before the king, and his counsellers, and before all the king’s mighty princes. And I was strengthened as the hand of the Lord my God was upon me, and I gathered together out of Israel chief men to go up with me. LEV 24:16 And he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, he shall surely be put to death, and all the congregation shall certainly stone him: as well the stranger, as he that is born in the land, when he blasphemeth the name of the Lord, shall be put to death. DEU 13:5 And that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams, shall be put to death; because he hath spoken to turn you away from the Lord your God, which brought you out of the land of Egypt, and redeemed you out of the house of bondage, to thrust thee out of the way which the Lord thy God commanded thee to walk in. So shalt thou put the evil away from the midst of thee. 6 If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us go and serve other gods, which thou hast not known, thou, nor thy fathers. 12 If thou shalt hear say in one of thy cities, which the Lord thy God hath given thee to dwell there, saying, etc. 2KI 18:4 He removed the high places, and brake the images, and cut down the groves, and brake in pieces the brasen serpent that Moses had made: for unto those days the children of Israel did burn incense to it: and he called it Nehushtan. (1CH 13:1-8; 2KI 24:1-25) 2CH 34:33 And Josiah took away all the abominations out of all the countries that pertained to the children of Israel, and made all that were present in Israel to serve, even to serve the Lord their God. And all his days they departed not from following the Lord, the God of their fathers. 2CH 15:12 And they entered into a covenant to seek the Lord God of their fathers with all their heart and with all their soul; 13 That whosoever would not seek the Lord God of Israel should be put to death, whether small or great, whether man or woman. [7] 2CH 19:8 Moreover in Jerusalem did Jehoshaphat set of the Levites, and of the priests, and of the chief of the fathers of Israel, for the judgment of the Lord, and for controversies, when they returned to Jerusalem. 9 And he charged them, saying, Thus shall ye do in the fear of the Lord, faithfully, and with a perfect heart. 10 And what cause soever shall come to you of your brethren that dwell in their cities, between blood and blood, between law and commandment, statutes and judgments, ye shall even warn them that they trespass not against the Lord, and so wrath come upon you, and upon your brethren: this do, and ye shall not trespass. 11 And, behold, Amariah the chief priest is over you in all matters of the Lord; and Zebadiah the son of Ishmael, the ruler of the house of Judah, for all the king’s matters: also the Levites shall be officers before you. Deal courageously, and the Lord shall be with the good. (2CH 29-30) MAT 2:4 And when he had gathered all the chief priests and scribes of the people together, he demanded of them where Christ should be born. 5 And they said unto him, In Bethlehem of Judaea: for thus it is written by the prophet.
Robert Shaw commenting says,
“Although the proper and immediate end of civil government, in subordination to God’s glory, is the temporal good of men, yet the advancement of religion is an end which civil rulers, in the exercise of their city authority, are bound to aim at; for even this direct end of their office cannot be gained without the aids of religion. And although magistracy has its foundation in natural principles, and Christianity invests civil rulers with no new powers, yet it greatly enlarges the sphere of the operation of that power which they possess, as civil rulers, from the law of nature. That law binds the subjects of God’s moral government, jointly and severally, to embrace and reduce to practice whatsoever God is pleased to reveal as the rule of their faith and duty. And therefore nations and their rulers, when favoured with divine revelation, should give their public countenance to the true religion; remove everything out of their civil constitution inconsistent with it, or tending to retard its progress; support and protect its functionaries in the discharge of their duty; and provide, in every way competent to them, that its salutary influence have free course, and be diffused through all orders and departments of society….
But while our Confession undeniably teaches, that the civil magistrate is authorised to do something about religion and the Church of Christ; yet it lays certain restrictions and limitations upon the exercise of his authority in regard to these matters. According to our Confession, the civil magistrate must not assume a lordly supremacy over the Church; for a there is no other head of the Church; but the Lord Jesus Christ.”–Chap. xxv., sect. 6. He must not interfere with her internal government; for “the Lord Jesus, as king and head of his Church, hath therein appointed a government in the hand of Church-officers, distinct from the civil magistrate;” and “to these officers the keys of the kingdom of heaven are committed.”–Chap. xxx., sect. 1, 2. He must not, as a magistrate, sustain himself a public judge of true or false religion, so as to dictate to his subjects in matters purely religious; for “it belongeth to synods and councils ministerially to determine controversies of faith and cases of conscience,” &c.–Chap. xxxi., sect. 3. In the first paragraph of the section now under consideration, there is another important limitation of the power of the civil magistrate in regard to the Church. It is expressly declared, that he may not take upon himself the administration of the ordinances of worship: “He may not assume to himself the administration of the Word and sacraments.” Neither may he take upon himself the administration of the government and discipline of the Church: “He may not assume to himself the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” The keys, in the most extensive sense, include the whole ecclesiastical power, in distinction from the sword, or the civil power. But “the power of the keys,” taken in its more limited sense, as it must be here, where it is distinguished from the administration of the Word and sacraments, just means the ordinary power of government, in the administration of the affairs of the Church; and more particularly, the right of authoritatively and judicially determining all questions that may arise as to the admission of men to ordinances and to office in the Church of Christ, and the infliction and relaxation of Church censures.” This is not the only restriction laid upon the power of the civil magistrate in the present section. It is also plainly intimated, that, in the execution of the duty here entrusted to him, he must be regulated by the Word of God. He is not to act arbitrarily, but must be guided by the standard of God’s Word. In regard to one important branch of the functions here assigned to him–that which concerns synods–it is expressly declared, that he is to see that “what is transacted in them be according to the mind of God”–the mind of God, as revealed in his Word, being thus distinctly prescribed as a rule to him, as it is to the ordinary members of synods. This principle was admitted by the Erastians of former times; for they conceded to their opponents, “that the Christian magistrate, in ordering and disposing of ecclesiastical causes and matters of religion, is tied to keep close to the rule of the Word of God; and that as he may not assume an arbitrary government of the State, so far less of the Church.” It may be further added, that, according to our Confession, the civil magistrate is bound to act, in his official capacity, “according to the wholesome laws of each commonwealth.” – Sect. 2. Now, as our Confession of Faith is founded upon the Word of God, so it is embodied in our Statute-Book; and, therefore, when civil rulers assume a proper jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, which the Confession has denied to them, their proceedings must be inconsistent at once with the Word of God and the law of the land…
The Confession specifies certain means which the civil magistrate may lawfully employ for effecting the objects mentioned: “For the better effecting whereof; he hath power to call synods.” From this it cannot be inferred that ministers have not a power to meet of themselves in synods and assemblies, without being called by the civil magistrate; for in chapter xxxi. it is expressly declared that they have such power “of themselves, and by virtue of their office.” The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, indeed, were of opinion that, in the chapter now referred to, the Confession is not sufficiently explicit in regard to the intrinsic power of the Church to call her own assemblies; and accordingly, in their Act of 1647, by which the Confession was approved, they expressly declare that they understood that part of it “only of kirks not settled or constituted in point of government;” and that explanation must apply equally to the section now before us. Our Confession, then, does not assert that the magistrate may exercise this power on all occasions, and in all circumstances, or whenever there are any evils of a religious kind to correct. It is sufficient that there may be times and circumstances in which he may warrantably exercise this power. When the state of the nation as well as of the Church may be convulsed, and its convulsions may be in a great degree owing to religious disorders, it is surely a high duty incumbent on him to take such a step, provided he finds it practicable and advisable.” (The Reformed Faith, http://www.reformed.org/documents/Robert Shaw/)
This view of establishment does not mean that the Christian Magistrate should force the conscience of man and neither does it force man’s attendance to public worship. Rutherford says in his book Free Disputation Chapter 4,
“5. The question is not whether religion can be enforced upon men by the Magistrate by the dint and violence of the sword, or only persuaded by the power of the word. We hold with Lactantius that religion cannot be compelled, nor can mercy and justice and love to our neighbour commaned in the second table, be more compelled then faith in Christ. Hence give me leave to prove two things. 1. That Religion and faith cannot be forced on men. 2. That this is a vain consequence, Religion cannot be forced but must be persuaded by the word and Spirit, Ergo the Magistrate can use no coercive power in punishing heretics and false teachers.
For the first, we lay hold on all the arguments that prove the word preached to be the only means of converting the soul, begetting of faith and that carnal weapons are not able, yea nor were they ever appointed of God, to ding down strong holds, nor can they make a willing people: and Lactantuis said well, What is left to us, if another’s lust extort that by force, which we must do willingly? And that of Tertullian. It is of the law or right of man and of his natural power what every man worships, what he thinks he should worship, nor doth the religion of one either do good or do evil to another man, nor is it religion to compel religion, which ought To be received by will not by force: since sacrifices (of worship) are required of a willing mind. In which I observe. 1. Tertullian speaks not of the true Christian religion which is now in question: but of religion in general as it is comprehensive of both true and false religion. Because he speaks of that religion which by the law of nature a man chooseth, and is humani juris and naturalis potestatis: but it is not of the law of man or natural power, nor in flesh and blood’s power to choose the true Christian religion, that election is Supernatural faith Tertullian there and else where often, as also the Scripture. John 6.44. Math. 16.17. Math. 11. 25, 26, 27. 2. Religion is taken two ways 1. for the inward and outward acts of religion as seen both to God and man as Lactantius, Tertullian and others say, so it is most true. Christians ought not with force of sword, compel Jews, nor Jews or pagans compel Christians to be of their religion, because religion is not begotten in any, by persuasion of the mind, nor by forcing of the man. Again religion is taken for the external profession and acting and performances of true religion within the church or by such as profess the truth, that are obvious to the eyes of Magistrates and pastors, and thus the sword is no means of God to force men positively to external worship or performances. But the sword is a means negatively to punish acts of false worship in those that are under the Christian Magistrate and profess Christian society, in so far as these acts come out to the eyes of men and are destructive to the souls of these in a Christian religion, Tis even so (and not otherwise punishable by the Magistrate;) for he may punish omissions of hearing the Doctrine of the Gospel and other external performances of worship, as these omissions by ill example or otherwise are offensive to the souls of these that are to lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty; nor does it follow that the sword is a kindly means to force outward performances, for the Magistrate as the Magistrate does not command these outward performances as service to God, but rather forbids the omissions of them as destructing to man… These are of a wide difference, to kill blasphemers, and false teachers for spreading heresies and blasphemies; and to compel them by war, and fire and sword to be of our Christian religion. As I hope to prove, for the former is lawful, the later unlawful. Its true Lactantius speaks of all religion true and false, that we are to compel none with the sword to any religion, but he no where saith that the Magistrates may not kill open and pernicious seducers and false teachers who pervert others, for the Magistrate is not to compel yea not to intend the conversion of a pernicious seducer, but to intend to take his head from him, for his destroying of souls. And Lactantius denies religion after it is begotten, can be defended, that is nourished and conserved in the hearts of people by the sword, but by the word and spirit. Those are far different tormenting and piety (saith he) nor can violence be conjoined with verity, nor justice with cruelty… I. Because the Magistrate cannot, nor ought not to compel evil doers , murderers, adulterers, robbers, liars, to be internally peaceably, chaste, content with their own as well as they must be such externally, no more than he can compel them to inward fear, love, faith in God, and to the external performances thereof. But it doth not follow that therefore the Magistrate cannot command external acts of mercy, chastity, self-contentedness, and should not punish murder, adultery, theft, robbery, perjury, for to punish these makes many hypocritically peaceable, chaste, content with their own, true in their word, as well as punishing false teachers and heretics maketh many hypocritically sound in the faith so Augustine contra Petilian.1.3. c. 83.”
However, this view of establishment does not allow complete freedom of speech and the press. The Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter 20, “Of Christian Liberty, and Liberty of Conscience.” Section 4 reads,
And because the powers which God hath ordained, and the liberty which Christ hath purchased, are not intended by God to destroy, but mutually to uphold and preserve one another; they who, upon pretence of Christian liberty, shall oppose any lawful power, or the lawful exercise of it, whether it be civil or ecclesiastical, resist the ordinance of God. And for their publishing of such opinions, or maintaining of such practices, as are contrary to the light of nature, or to the known principles of Christianity, whether concerning faith, worship, or conversation; or to the power of godliness; or such erroneous opinions or practices, as either in their own nature, or in the manner of publishing or maintaining them, are destructive to the external peace and order which Christ hath established in the church; they may lawfully be called to account, and proceeded against by the censures of the church, and by the power of the civil magistrate.
So the Reformed view does not persecute private idolatry but public idolatry (Deut 17:3-5, 13:5,).
This does not mean that a Presbyterian establishment is a Gestapo that spies on its citizens in residential areas to catch them saying something worthy of negative civil sanction. It also does not mean that everyone who disagrees with the state is put to death. Rushdoony says,
“It should be noted that Deuteronomy 13: 5-18 does not call for the death penalty for unbelief or for heresy. It condemns false prophets (vv. 1-5) who seek to lead the people, with signs and wonders, into idolatry. It does condemn individuals who secretly try to start a movement into idolatry (vv. 6-11). It does condemn cities which establish another religion and subvert the law-order of the nation (vv. 13-18), and this condemnation must be enforced by man to turn away the judgment of God (v. 17) { (Rushdoony, Rousas John. 1973. The Institutes of Biblical Law. Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 39: quoted from Michael Wagner in his A Presbyterian Political Manifesto (SWRB Site, available at: http://www.swrb.com/newslett/actualNLs/presbpol.htm ; [Accessed December 20111]) }
Thomas M’Crie qualifies the restrictions on speech and the press,
“Now, this does not say that all who publish such opinions and maintain such practices (as are here mentioned) may be proceeded against, or, punished (if the substitution of this word shall be insisted for) by the civil magistrate; nor does it say, that any good and peaceable subject shall be made liable to this process simply on the ground of religious opinions published and practices maintained by him. For, in the first place, persons of a particular character are spoken of in this paragraph, and these are very different from good and peaceable subjects. They are described in the former sentence as “they who oppose lawful power or the lawful exercise of it,” and “resist the ordinance of God.” The same persons are spoken of in the sentence under consideration, as appears from the copulative and relative. It is not said, “Any one for publishing,” etc., but “they who oppose any lawful power, etc. for their publishing,” etc. In the second place, this sentence specifies some of the ways in which these persons may become chargeable with the opposition mentioned, and consequently “may be called to account;” but it does not assert that even they must or ought to be prosecuted for every avowed opinion or practice of the kind referred to. . . . For, be it observed, it is not the design of the paragraph to state the objects of church censure or civil prosecution; its proper and professed object is to interpose a check on the abuse of liberty of conscience as operating to the prejudice of just and lawful authority. It is not sin as sin, but as scandal, or injurious to the spiritual interests of Christians, that is the proper object of church censure; and it is not for sins as such, but for crimes, that persons become liable to punishment by magistrates. The compilers of the Confession were quite aware of these distinctions, which were then common. . . . To render an action the proper object of magisterial punishment, it is not enough that it be contrary to the law of God, whether natural or revealed; it must, in one way or another, strike against the public good of society.” ([1821] 1989, 163-164). (M’Crie, Thomas. [1821] 1989. Unity of the Church. Dallas, Texas: Presbyterian Heritage Publications.: Quoted from Michael Wagner)
We can also gain instruction from the way the stranger is dealt with in the Old Covenant. Rushdoony states,
“God’s law repeatedly refers to the stranger and requires particular recognition of their [sic] freedom. They are not to be oppressed, and discrimination against them is forbidden. “One law shall be to him that is homeborn, and unto the stranger that sojourneth among you” (Ex.12:49). This law was given to Israel in Egypt, before their departure, to stress the fact that justice is without respect of persons. The protection of the law must extend to aliens: “Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country: for I am the LORD your God” (Lev. 24:22; Num. 15:15,16). Racial or national differences could not be used to bar aliens from knowledge of God’s law, nor from the Passover (Num.9:14; Deut. 7:10-12; Josh. 8:34f.). Because the foreigner, if not seeking admission into the covenant, had another religion, he was not required to abide by the ritual laws the covenant requires. He could enter into long-term debt, for example (Deut.15:3; cf. 23:21), and disregard the dietary laws (Deut. 14:21). The foreigner could not ascend Israel’s throne (Deut. 17:15). However, his status was that of a privileged guest (Rushdoony, Rousas John. 1986. Christianity and the State. Vallecito, California: Ross House Books: Quoted from Michael Wagner).”
This Protestant Establishment is in direct contradiction to the popular Social Contract theories of the modern secular world. On this Reformed Protestant view the proper constitution of a civil government is based on a covenant with the Lord of Heaven. This affirms a religious people coming together under a social covenant unto the Lord. So what is the difference? First some orientation.
The modern views of government primarily derive from three individuals: Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, but Locke is the primary political theorist of our civilization. Locke was born in 1632 to Puritanic parents in England. In 1647 he studied at the Westminster School in London. In fulfillment of the Jesuit purpose of the Counter-Reformation, Locke became a follower of the Jesuit constructed philosophy of Rene Descartes. In 1675 he left to France to observe medical studies and in 1679 Locke returned to England to help Lord Shaftesbury in the debates concerning the Exclusion Bill (Anti-Catholic Legislation; Shaftesbury was a Whig and a supporter of the Bill and the removal of Romanist influence in Government ). They were exiled for this. Subsequently, he began writing his Two Treatises.
The Social Contract is the political theory that theoretically men begin in a state of nature. The state of nature is understood in different ways. Hobbes’ view is that in this state,
“men are naturally and exclusively self-interested, they are more or less equal to one another…there are limited resources, and yet there is no power able to force men to cooperate…According to Hobbes, the justification for political obligation is this: given that men are naturally self-interested, yet they are rational, they will choose to submit to the authority of a Sovereign in order to be able to live in a civil society, which is conducive to their own interests.” (Social Contract, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011)
First, how does he know all men are self-interested and all men are rational? Second, we see the inherent atheism in this view in that a covenant with God is completely missing. Civil Society has one purpose: commerce. The Constitution Society describes the purpose of civil government this way,
“Whenever any two or more individuals meet with the understanding and expectation that they will live together in harmony and not fight with one another using any available means, they are establishing a Social Contract among themselves.” (The Social Contract and Constitutional Republics)
Again, the Social Contract here is secular. It is a business contract not a human society. Locke’s justification for government was, “Since the State of Nature lacks civil authority, once war begins it is likely to continue. And this is one of the strongest reasons that men have to abandon the State of Nature by contracting together to form civil government.” (Social Contract, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011) Harold Laski, expounding more of Locke’s view says in Political Thought in England from Locke to Bentham
“There is no common superior to enforce the law of nature. Each man, as best he may, works out his own interpretation of it. But because the intelligences of men are different there is an inconvenient variety in the conceptions of justice. The result is uncertainty and chaos; and means of escape must be found from a condition which the weakness of men must ultimately make intolerable. It is here that the Social Contract emerges. But just as Locke’s natural state implies a natural man utterly distinct from Hobbes’ gloomy picture, so does Locke’s Social Contract represent rather the triumph of reason than of hard necessity. It is a contract of each with all, a surrender by the individual of his personal right to fulfil the commands of the law of nature in return for the guarantee that his rights as nature ordains them—life and liberty and property—will be preserved. The contract is thus not general as with Hobbes but limited and specific in character. Nor is it, as Hobbes made it, the resignation of power into the hands of some single man or group. On the contrary, it is a contract with the community as a whole which thus becomes that common political superior—the State—which is to enforce the law of nature and punish infractions of it. Nor is Locke’s state a sovereign State: the very word “sovereignty” does not occur, significantly enough, throughout the treatise. The State has power only for the protection of natural law. Its province ends when it passes beyond those boundaries.” (Pg. 41-42)
First, how does he know that war will continue? Is this another evidence of the solipsism of empiricism? Second, Civil Government is a deterrent from War? The exact opposite affirmation is the basis of Anarchism, which states that civil governments are designed primarily to make the rich richer through war and the powerful more powerful. Third, we see again the utter secularism of this so called Social Contract. None of these theories point to the God of heaven and man’s obligations to him. The Reformed view of the State of Nature is found in Rutherford’s Lex Rex Q. 13,
“Assert. 1. — As a man cometh into the world a member of a politic society, he is, by consequence, born subject to the laws of that society; but this maketh him not, from the womb and by nature, subject to a king, as by nature he is subject to his father who begat him, no more than by nature a lion is born subject to another king-lion; for it is by accident that he is born of parents under subjection to a monarch, or to either democratical or aristocratical governors, for Cain and Abel were born under none of these forms of government properly; and if he had been born in a new planted colony in a wilderness, where no government were yet established, he should be under no such government.
Assert. 2. — Slavery of servants to lords or masters, such as were of old amongst the Jews, is not natural, but against nature. 1. Because slavery is malum naturæ, a penal evil and contrary to nature, and a punishment of sin. 2. Slavery should not have been in the world, if man had never sinned, no more than there could have been buying and selling of men, which is a miserable consequent of sin and a sort of death, when men are put to the toiling pains of the hireling, who longeth for the shadow, and under iron harrows and saws, and to hew wood, and draw water continually. 3. The original of servitude was, when men were taken in war, to eschew a greater evil, even death, the captives were willing to undergo a less evil, slavery, (S. Servitus, 1 de jure. Pers.) 4. A man being created according to God’s image, he is res sacra, a sacred thing, and can no more, by nature’s law, be sold and bought, than a religious and sacred thing dedicated to God…Assert. 3. — Every man by nature is a freeman born, that is, by nature no man cometh out of the womb under any civil subjection to king, prince, or judge, to master, captain, conqueror, teacher, &c.
Arg. 1. — Because freedom is natural to all, except freedom from subjection to parents; and subjection politic is merely accidental, coming from some positive laws of men, as they are in a politic society; whereas they might have been born with all concomitants of nature, though born in a single family, the only natural and first society in the world…
Arg. 5. — If men be not by nature free from politic subjection, then must some, by the law of relation, by nature be kings. But none are by nature kings, because none have by nature these things which essentially constitute kings, for they have neither by nature the calling of God, nor gifts for the throne; nor the free election of the people, nor conquest; and if there be none a king by nature, there can be none a subject by nature…
Arg. 6…Scripture cleareth to us, that a king is made by the free consent of the people, (Deut xvii. 15,) and so not by nature.
Arg. 7. — What is from the womb, and so natural, is eternal, and agreeth to all societies of men; but a monarchy agreeth not to all societies of men; for many hundred years; de facto, there was not a king till Nimrod’s time, the world being governed by families, and till Moses’ time we find no institution for kings, (Gen. vii.) and the numerous multiplication of mankind did occasion monarchies, otherwise, fatherly government being the first and measure of the rest, must be the best; for it is better that my father govern me, than that a stranger govern me, and, therefore, the Lord forbade his people to set a stranger over themselves to be their king…
3. God and nature hath laid a necessity on all men to be under government, a natural necessity from the womb to be under some government, to wit, a paternal government, that is true; but under this government politic, and namely under sovereignty, it is false; and that is but said: for why is he naturally under sovereignty rather than aristocracy? I believe any of the three forms are freely chosen by any society. 4. It is false that one cannot defend the people, except he have entire power, that is to say, he cannot do good except he have a vast power to do both good and ill.”
Do rights derive from the Social Contract or are they alienated and surrendered to the contract? Rousseau said both. The French Revolution was adamant on inalienable rights so how this works is anyone’s best guess. How can someone surrender over what they only get after the contract has been made? The arbitrary nature of rights in Social Contract Theory is exposed in such an example: If the socially contracted moral person added an amendment calling for the extermination of a certain ethnicity, this moral person would not just have the force, BUT THE RIGHT to do so. If not then we must have a different source of rights than a Social Contract. On this arbitrary secular view, Laws are simply arbitrary conventions or instruments of government. Weapons are also instruments of government, and here we see the reason to use them is as arbitrary as the laws enacted upon those who kill with them. On the Christian view, laws are manifestations of the will of God; at least as they reflect the Moral Law of God in the Bible. Therefore, the secular world needs to give us a better definition of law and tell us how they know about these laws before their theory can be recognized to even get off the ground. The Social Contract Theory asserts that the purpose of government is to codify the terms of agreement among men in order to ensure tranquility and liberty among men. The Westminster Confession Chapter 23 Of the Civil Magistrate says,
I. God, the supreme Lord and King of all the world, has ordained civil magistrates, to be, under Him, over the people, for His own glory, and the public good: and, to this end, has armed them with the power of the sword, for the defence and encouragement of them that are good, and for the punishment of evil doers.[1] [1] ROM 13:1 Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. 2 Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. 3 For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: 4 For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. 1PE 2:13 Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord’s sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme; 14 Or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, and for the praise of them that do well. (CRTA)
Here the Confession affirms something “religious” about human society. Inherent to human society is religion and so the magistrate is God’s representative in a society of men as a minster of God’s justice, discerning between Good and Evil as it is revealed in the Scriptures. It is because of this that a Christian should never believe the Social Contract Theory. Aside from this religious criticism, there is also a secular criticism. Proudhon will ask, how do you know that a civil institution is required for agreement and tranquility among men? He will affirm a moral urge that is sufficient for these things. (Anarchism by George Woodcock, pg. 15) And I will ask the same. How do you know that a civil institution is required for these things?
Dr. Gordon Clark says with reference to the Christian view of government, “The basic thought is that government is a divine institution. The authority of magistrates does not derive from any voluntary social compact, but it derives from God.” (Christian View, pg. 99) I would only qualify this by adding that magistracy in the abstract is a divine institution; not every concrete magistrate.
Social Contract theorists talk about how individual citizens surrender their rights over to a group contract wherein a moral person is created among them. How can the abstract concept of a moral person be produced from sensation? That is, where can I see or touch a moral person? If I cannot then the atheistic theory of empiricism must be abandoned or the moral person theory abandoned, you cannot have it both ways.
Where does a government or anyone get the authority to coerce someone else? By what right does a majority coerce a minority? Is the majority decision distinct from common good? If so what is the distinction? Every time I have asked this of Secularists they just look real funny at me, like they never even thought of that before. This is why Social Contract demands a unanimous agreement in a body politic. Good luck with that one. No such government exists or ever has existed. If you hold to this theory you must admit that no ACTUAL government rules by right. By what right does a Social Contract coerce the children of the body politic to contract and surrender their rights? How will the government continue? This is why Christians have historically Baptized their infants because they understand the Patriarchal nature of humanity (Baptists reject infant baptism as they reject the inherent Patriarchalism of Religion); Covenant obligations are passed down to the children through the Patriarch or head of the house. Here we see the inherent atheism ingrained in Baptist Theology. This is why Baptistic and Atheistic views of society are such a fringe in the history of the world. They are inhuman and cannot begin to address rudimentary issues of human society.
This brings us to the Reformed explanation of the Social Covenant Theory. The following quotations are taken from section 11 in the Reformed Presbyterian Catechism
by William Roberts (1853) [Still Waters Revival Books Site, available at: http://www.swrb.com/newslett/actualNLs/prescatcov.htm (accessed December 20011)]
“Q. Are religious covenants either personal or social?
A. They are both. 1. Personal, when an individual engages, on the one hand, to keep the cnmmandments of the Lord, and takes hold by faith, on the other, of God’s gracious promise. 2. Social, when a society engages with joint concurrence to perform certain duties, and to embrace with one heart the precious promises of Jehovah.
Q. Is it competent to any society, be it a family, a church, or a nation, to enter with common understanding and consent into a federal transaction?
A. Yes. And when this is done by a large corporate body, the transaction is called a public social covenant, which is the subject of consideration in this section.
Q. What is public social covenanting?
A. It is a solemn religious transaction in which men, with joint concurrence, avouch the Lord to be their God, and engage, in all the relations of life, to serve him by obedience to his law, in the performance of all civil and religious duties in the confidence of his favour and blessing in the fulfilment to them of all his gracious promises. Deut. xxix. 10-13. “Ye stand this day all of you before the Lord your God; your captains of your tribes, your elders, and your officers, with all the men of Israel. Your little ones, your wives, and thy stranger that is in thy camp, from the hewer of thy wood unto the drawer of thy water; that thou shouldst enter into covenant with the Lord thy God, and into his oath, which the Lord thy God maketh with thee this day: that he may establish thee to-day for a people unto himself, and that he may be unto thee a God, as he hath said unto thee, and as he hath sworn unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob.” Josh. xxiv. 1,25. 2 Chr. xv. 9,12,15. Is. xix. 18. Jer. xi. 10.
Q. By what arguments can it be proved that public social covenanting is of divine authority, and so of moral obligation?
A. By numerous arguments. 1. The light of nature. The mariners of Tarshish, Jonah i. 16. “Then the men feared the Lord exceedingly, and offered a sacrifice unto the Lord, and made vows.” Epictetus, a heathen moralist, thus expresses himself: “To this God we ought to swear an oath, such as the soldiers swear to Caesar. They, indeed, by the inducement of their wages, swear that they will value the safety of Caesar before all things; and will you, then, honoured with so many and so great benefits, not swear to God? or having sworn, will you not continue stedfast?” 2. Scripture precepts. Ps. lxxvi. 11. “Vow and pay unto the Lord your God.” Jer. iv. 6. “Thou shalt swear the Lord liveth in truth, in judgment, and in righteousness.” Also, xliv. 26, and Deut. x. 20. 2. Chr. xxx. 8. “Yield (give the hand) yourselves unto the Lord-and serve the Lord your God;” and Rom. vi. 13, Mat. v. 33. “Thou shalt perform unto the Lord thy oaths.” Rom. xii. 1. 3. Scripture examples. Deut. xxvi. 15-19. “Thou hast avouched the Lord to be thy God-and the Lord hath avouched thee this day to be his peculiar people-that thou shouldst keep all his commandments.” xxix. 10-13. Quoted above, Josh. xxiv. 1,25-“So Joshua made a covenant with the people that day,” &c. 2 Kings xi. 17. “And Jehoiada made a covenant between the Lord and the king and the people, that they should be the Lord’s people.” xxiii. 1,2; also, Neh. x. 29, &c.
Q. Is not covenanting a duty confined to ancient times, and not obligatory under the present dispensation?
A. As it is of moral obligation, it is consequently a duty incumbent upon present times; for things which are moral do not diminish in their obligation by the lapse of time.
Q. By what arguments can its obligation in New Testament times, be solidly proved?
A. By the following. 1. It was obviously a duty under the Old Testament dispensation, and being nowhere repealed, and being moral and not typical, it is of present obligation. Ps. lxxvi. 11, “Vow and pay unto the Lord your God.” 2. Scripture prophecies, evidently referring to New Testament times, and even yet to be fulfilled. Is. xix. 18,21,23,24,25, “In that day (the latter day) shall five cities in the land of Egypt speak the language of Canaan, and swear to the Lord of hosts,” &c., &c. Jer. iv. 4,5. “In those days (Millennial), and in that time, saith the Lord, the children of Israel shall come, they and the children of Judah together, going and weeping; they shall go and seek the Lord their God. They shall ask the way to Zion with their faces thitherward, saying, Come and let us join ourselves to the Lord in a perpetual covenant that shall not be forgotten.” 3. The New Testament recognises the obligation. Rom. vi. 13. Compare 2 Chr. xxx. 8, 2 Cor. viii. 5. The Macedonian churches, says Paul, “Not as we hoped, but first gave their ownselves unto the Lord, and unto us by the will of God.” Not in the Lord’s supper, which Paul certainly hoped they would do, but to his surprise, in a public social covenant. Rom. i. 7. “Covenant breakers” have a place in the catalogue of sinners, whose conduct is denounced as displeasing to the Almighty; which could not be the case, unless on the supposition of the continued obligation of covenanting. 4. It was one of the distinguishing privileges of the Jews to be in covenant with God. “I am married unto you, saith the Lord.” The privileges of the New Testament dispensation are increased and not diminished. Heb. xii. 18,22. 5. This duty is involved in the church’s relation to God, as a married relation. Hos. ii. 19,20; Eph. v. 30, iv. 25. Covenanting is only a solemn recognition of this relation, and engagement to evidence this by a life and conversation becoming the Gospel. Is. lxii. 4, evidently alludes to New Testament times, and celebrates not only an ecclesiastical, but national marriage. By the marriage of a land unto God, we are not to understand that the trees of the forest, the mountains or plains come under engagements. Surely it must be the nation inhabiting the land. National marriage implies a national deed whereby the inhabitants, in their national capacity, solemnly covenant unto God. 6. The duty, when performed in its true spirit, is a source of unspeakable benefit to a people; and, as nations seek the blessing, they should perform the duty. Ps. cxliv. 15, “Happy is that people that is in such a case; yea, happy is that people whose God is the Lord.” Bound to God and he to them in “an everlasting covenant, not to be forgotten.”
An earlier problem mentioned for Social Contract Theory, is the problem of extending the obligation of the Social Contract business agreement to the next generation. Here the Reformed Presbyterian Catechism offers a straight answer where the Social Contract view remains forever dumb,
“Q. Are public social covenants of continuous obligation? or, are they binding upon the posterity of the original covenanters, as long as the corporate body exists; or, until such time as the object for which they were framed has been accomplished?
A. They are; and this position is sustained by forcible arguments. 1. We find posterity recognised in the transaction between God and Jacob, at Bethel. Gen. xxviii. 13; compared with Hosea xii. 4. “He found him (Jacob) in Bethel, and there he spake with us.” 2. We have another remarkable instance of the transmission of covenant obligation to posterity in Deut. v. 2,3. “The Lord our God made a covenant with us in Horeb. The Lord made not this covenant with our fathers (only) but with us, even us, who are all of us here alive this day.” 3. Another example occurs in Deut. xxix. 10-15; the covenant is here made with three descriptions of persons. 1. With those addressed adults. “Neither with you only.” 2. Minors. “Him that standeth here with us.” 3. Posterity. “Him that is not here with us this day”-for this could have no reference to any of the Israelites then in existence, as they were all present. It must, therefore, include posterity, together with all future accessions to the community. With them, Moses informs us, the covenant was made, as well as with those who actually entered into it, in the plains of Moab. 4. Another instance in which posterity is recognised in covenant obligation is found in Joshua ix. 15. This covenant was made between the children of Israel and the Gibeonites. Between four and five hundred years after that time, the children of Israel are visited with a very severe famine, in the days of David. 2 Sam. xxi. 1. And it is expressly declared by the Lord that, “It is for Saul, and for his bloody house, because he slew the Gibeonites.” And at the same time, v. 2, that very covenant is recognised, and the breach of it is stated, as being the formal reason of the divine displeasure. Now, had it not been for this covenant, the extirpation of the Gibeonites would not have been imputed to Israel as a thing criminal; for they were comprehended in Caananitish nations, which God had commanded them to root out. 5. Posterity are charged with the sin of violating the covenant of their ancestors. Jer. xi. 10. “The house of Israel, and the house of Judah, have broken my covenant which I made with their fathers”-by which they are evidently considered as bound. 6. The principle of federal representation confirms this doctrine. Thus when Joseph made a covenant with his brethren, that they should carry up his bones from Egypt to the land of promise, he assumed that those whom he addressed, were the representatives of their successors, as he knew well that the whole of that generation should die before the deliverance of Israel by Moses. Posterity recognised the obligation. Ex. xiii. 19. A similar case of federal representation, is that of the Gibeonites quoted above. 6. Infant baptism is a forcible illustration of the continuous obligation of covenants. 7. The principle of the transmissibility of the obligations of covenants to posterity, is recognised by civilians in civil matters. In the obligations, for example, of the heir of an estate, for the engagements of his predecessor in the possession of it. All national treaties and other engagements of the corporate body, descend with all their weight upon succeeding generations.”
It is for this reason that the Constitution of the United States must be amended to acknowledge the God of Heaven in covenant with him, and to forever reject the idea that a government can be lawfully ordained on the authority of the people alone.
Objections:
1. Prov 8: 15 “By me kings reign, And rulers decree justice. 16 “By me princes rule, and nobles, All who judge rightly. Here Solomon is choosing a king, not the people.
Ans. This also mentions princes and nobles. Are these also without election and irresistible?
2. 2 Kings 8: 12 Hazael said, “Why does my lord weep?” Then he answered, “Because I know the evil that you will do to the sons of Israel: their strongholds you will set on fire, and their young men you will kill with the sword, and their little ones you will dash in pieces, and their women with child you will rip up.” 13 Then Hazael said, “But what is your servant, who is but a dog, that he should do this great thing?” And Elisha answered, “The LORD has shown me that you will be king over Aram.” The king is not made by the people by directly from God.
Ans. Elisha anointed and foretold, he did not constitute.
Like this:
Like Loading...
Leave a Response »