Ryan Hedrich has written a reply to my last article here. I reply:
“On Drake’s view, that which is necessary according to God’s nature is also necessary according to His will. But that which God wills is not necessarily necessary according to His nature”
>>>I fundamentally reject this. I have said this to you many times Ryan. All of God’s volitions have to be in according with his nature. You are terminating all of God’s activities on absolute necessities of nature. I believe that some of God’s actions are not absolute necessities of nature, but activities agreeable to nature. You even state it:
“Now, in our last discussion, Drake agreed that “what God wills must be agreeable to His nature.”
>>>Thank you.
“But, as I just mentioned, he also said he doesn’t think that God’s nature determines everything He wills.”
>>>Depends on what you mean by “determines”. His nature sets the bounds of what the will may pursue.
Turriten says,
“The will can be called the primary rule of justice either intrinsically or extrinsically…In the former sense, his will is regulated by his justice; in thelatter sense, the justice in us is regulated by nothing else than his will…But with respect to God, the will cannot always be called the first rule of justice. It is a rule in those things which have only a free and positive goodness, but not in those things which have essential goodness…For in the latter, God’s will is regulated, not indeed extrinsically but intrinsically (viz. BY HIS MOST HOLY NATURE). Hence it has been well said that certain things are good because God wills them…but that God wills others because they are just and good per se in their own nature…”
Institutes, Vol 1, pg. 233, Third Topic, The Will of God, xviii, Third Topic, The Will of God, xviii, (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P&R Publishing, 1994) Muller affirms this on page 455, in Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics Vol. 3(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2003)
What you believe is that the bounds are jointly exhaustive with the will and thus you have conflated the two IMO. Thus there really are no bounds there is just the activity of nature. See you even state my position:
“His nature prescribes the boundaries of what can be willed in all cases, but it does not determine what must be willed in all cases.”
>>>Thank you.
In that case, the argument I outline in the above paragraphs is little different than what it was then:
“The only problem, as I see it, is that on your position, no answer can be given as to why the divine will instantiated this “world” (or reality) over against another “world” which would have similarly been agreeable to the divine nature.”
>>>Chronologically: Because God’s will is eternal. The chronological reason why he didn’t instantiate another world is because his choice to instantiate this one is eternal and immutable. Logically: I don’t know. We have been over this before. Just because we cannot answer why God decided to do this or that is not a problem, it is simply a spehere inn which God has not revealed himself. I already said this to you a long time ago:
“Even Clark realized that we don’t have answers to everything. My lack of omniscience does not imply a contradiction. God has not revealed that to us completely. This particular complaint is embarrassing for you as a Calvinist. Why does God choose one man over another to be his elect? Is his decision arbitrary? ; Or did He have a [non-arbitrary] reason? If the latter, does not such a reason imply that His will is naturally necessitated? So now, God is necessitated to redeem. So then his mercy is dependent on him showing that mercy to a creature. The exact complaint that I showed is pagan dualism. https://eternalpropositions.wordpress.com/2011/10/01/darkness-a-consistent-hyper-calvinist/”
http://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2011/09/impossible-worlds-absolute-necessity.html
—–
“There must be some other “world” agreeable to the divine nature on your view, or else this world would have been necessary, a point to which you strenuously object.”
>>>I still think you are using the word “necessary” ambiguously. Along with the nature-will conflation I think we now have a logical necessity-chronological necessity conflation arising.
I believe that this world is chronologically necessary not logically necessary. I think you believe that it is both. Thus in order for your argument to be consistent, you must provide the logical reason why God chose one man over another for salvation. If one must know every reason behind God’s volitions to escape arbitrarity, then you must explain the logical reason why God chose one man over another to be his elect. The last time I brought this up you said,
“In a manner of speaking, this is true. I think it would be more technically correct to say that while we have the reason – it is according to His good pleasure because it maximally manifests His glory – we are at present unable to understand how the election of one man over against another (abstractly considered) functions toward this end. It’s a question of how, not why. And in any case, I admit that there is a necessary reason for electing one man over against another.”
http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=3295328575953992372&postID=8765669237075071740
You also said,
“Are you saying that because God’s glory would be maximally manifested by His creation of this world, this world is what He chose to create?”
To which I replied,
>>>Maybe, maybe not. The MODE AND CIRCUMSTANCE is not revealed only the essential purpose [God”s glory-DS].
You responded,
“What mode and circumstance are you referring to, and how is it revealed (or is it)?”
To which I replied,
“>>>Your assertion is that THIS PARTICULAR creation (mode and circumstance of a creation) is a necessity of divine nature for the maximizing of God’s glory. I say that this particular creation is not a necessity of nature but a [chronological] necessity deriving from the eternality of divine will for God’s glory. I am not going to commit myself to the idea that THIS PARTICULAR creation is the only possible way God could have maximized his glory. Maybe it is, maybe it isn’t I don’t know.”
——-
“I believe last time we established that another such “world” would have been one in which God didn’t create.”
>>>And I replied that your statement itself is meaningless, because you are making God a world. I said,
“Sure it does. You want to put God into the category of the “other possible world” and the entire endeavor is getting quite goofy.”
Your argument assumes upon a denial of creation ex nihilo.
“That would be, you said, consistent with the divine nature.”
>>>Did I? Where? I thought I challenged the meaning of your premise every time.
“This is why the instantiation of this “world” must have been arbitrary relative to any other “world” which would have been agreeable to the divine nature. This is why I say that on your view, the divine will is arbitrary. Anything you could adduce as a reason for God’s instantiation of this “world” (e.g. “for His glory”) could without exception have been adduced as a reason for the other.”
>>>That same argument could be applied to soteriology, which you have yet to face. An appeal to ignorance is not an appeal to arbitrarity.
“The word “reason” can be replaced by the word “basis” and as we have discussed many times there are two of those in God: nature and will. So yes you could ask what was the basis of his eternal will, and I would respond, the agreeability of his nature.
“I am afraid the point has been missed. If I ask what the basis or reason is that, given that world A (in which God creates) and world B (in which God never creates) are both agreeable to His nature, God chose to instantiate world A rather than world B, the answer “it was agreeable to His nature” doesn’t suffice.”
>>>That is because you have changed the question. Notice, above the question is “What is the basis for God’s will to create”? In the latter the question is, “why is this world agreeable to his nature and another is not?” TO THAT QUESTION I TAP OUT IN IGNORANCE.
“Drake does mention that there are two “reasons” or “bases”in God, but He doesn’t elaborate as to what that means.”
>>>Reason 1-A chronological necessity extending fro the eternality of the divine will.
Reason 2- A logical necessity extending from the absolute necessity or agreeability of the divine nature.
“in what way does his answers to these questions solve the problem of seeming arbitrariness (i.e. God’s choosing of world A which is no more or less agreeable to His nature than world B would have been)?”
>>>I have already refuted the premise that ignorance=arbitrarity.
“Firstly, I have to wonder what was the point of the previous questions designed to determine whether I was speaking of necessity “according to nature”or necessity “according to will” when it is apparent he already knew I was speaking about the former.”
>>>I don’t understand this paragraph.
“More importantly, how is the will of God necessary if it is not necessitated by His nature?”
>>>Chronologically. Thus other possible worlds are chronologically eliminated.
“Now Drake offers a few criticisms of his own. Firstly, he thinks that my assertion that there are not multiple possible worlds agreeable to God’s nature implies “a conflation of activity, essence and existence. This is ADS.”
>>>The exact phrase I responded to was, “but I assert that creation is not consubstantial with the Father because the Father did not [and, therefore, could not”. Here we have activity (Which I use synonymously with existence IN THIS CONTEXT), “the Father did”, with nature and will, “could not”. I don’t think you have fairly faced the argument. .
“why does Drake think that “the Son and Spirit [are] said to be eternally begotten and spirated because the divine nature is communicated to them” suggests arbitrarity?”
>>>Because on my view eternal generation and spiration are the means/channels/relation, by which the communication is made. If they already have the communication logically before the eternal generation and spiration, there is no need for these activities. They are arbitrarily thrown into the mix to make it look like the Christian view.
“I stated the existences of the Son and Spirit are necessary in any case, so if everything God wills is to maximize the manifestation of His glory, and the Father has communicated divinity (and individuating properties) to two other subjects, the logical conclusion is that this communication is willed for His glory”
>>>That activity is not from the will but the nature.
“which is clearly not ad hoc.”
>>>You are confusing categories. You think that purpose equals basis. You are getting the cart before the horse.
His last argument, stated here, explains why he thinks that it is necessary to maintain that creation is not necessary according to God’s nature, and this, unless I am mistaken, is supposed to show why that which is derived by a necessity of nature is that to which the divine nature is communicated. Essentially, the argument is that if creation is necessary according to God’s nature, such makes God’s nature dependent on creation, which is pagan.
>>>Which you have already admitted to:
“I think I finally understand your argument. I haven’t really grasped it until now. It’s this:
God’s nature is His attributes. You think that I am asserting God’s nature depends on creation in the sense that God’s mercy, wrath, justice, compassion, goodness, etc. (or at least one of those attributes) requires a creation. If mercy et. al. could be predicated of God apart from creation, then it could not be the case that creation necessarily follows from the divine nature. If mercy et. al. cannot be predicated of God apart from creation, these divine attributes would “depend” on creation, and so divine nature wouldn’t be self-sufficient in that sense. Is that right?
This seems true and that you have a point here. I need to think about it, as well as the implications of each position. Could you expand a bit more on what would follow if God’s self-sufficiency were denied? You’ve referenced a few concepts, but I would need more than just “that’s Plotinian” or pagan. Not to say that I would want to be associated with either, obviously, but I still have one problem with your position:”
http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=3295328575953992372&postID=8765669237075071740
———
“But dependent in what sense? In my article on Clarke, Drake made the point – with which I agree – that the properties of the Father logically depend on the Son. The Father cannot be the Father unless there is a Son, which is no problem since the Son has always existed. But this isn’t pagan, is it?”
>>>No, it is not pagan because as you admit, the Son is not a creature, he is eternal. But wait, we have already established though, that the Son is consubstantial with the Father.
“The Son metaphysically depends on the Father, yet the Father too in some sense depends on the Son. If no deficiency in the Father is implied in this case, then I do not see why, by way of analogy, it may not be said that creation is necessary according to God’s nature so long as it is clarified that any implied dependency doesn’t suggest deficiency.”
>>>First of all, my argument (Which is the same as my argument regarding divine infinity), is that an absolute necessity to create extending from the divine nature (ANC), requires that the meaning of the attributes, their definition, is dependent on a creation. A dependence, not in the order of existing in the genus of being, but a logical order in the genus of epistemology. Thus this logical dependency, requires that the objects juxtaposed to the attributes, must always be so juxtaposed in order that the attributes may be so defined. Thus the creation must also be eternal.
So the emphasis, is not on a deficiency, in the order of existing in the genus of being, but on the nature of the logical juxtaposition, which is the Neoplatonic, infinte-finite; ying and yang dialectic.
“Indeed, creation is from God precisely because God had a reason to create. That this reason is necessary according to His nature rather anticipates any objection that this reason is externally imposed on God.”
>>>I am not saying that your view imposes a creation above God, just like Plotinus did not place the hierarchy of being above the One but emanating out of it.
“God is sufficiently able to effect that which He most strongly desires; the fact that He must do so according to His nature is not because of what creation is”
>>>By “what creation is”, do you refer to the genus of being or epistemology?
“The creation clearly metaphysically depends on the Creator”
>>In the order of existing sure, but the meaning of both is dependent on the juxtaposition in your theology.
“but it must also be kept in mind that it is the nature of God that determines the nature of creation”
>>>In the genus of being, but not in the genus of epistemology. Thus in the order of existing, not the logical order: on your theology, and guess what, in Plotinus’ theology.
“It is rather like epistemology: in epistemology, there are axioms and theorems. In short, axioms are the set of propositions purported to be sufficient in order for knowledge to be possible.”
>>>But that knowledge depends on a genus of being, an order of existing which begins with the mind of the Father.
“They are preconditions for knowledge.”
>>>In the genus of epistemology sure, and I know these two genuses have some overlap, but the “existence” of the Father’s mind, makes all that epistemology possible in the order of existing.
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Anglo Judaizer 
//I fundamentally reject this.//
No you don’t. You simply misread my statement. You think, as do I, that God’s will must be agreeable with His nature. However, you clearly don’t think God’s will is [always] necessitated by His nature. That is precisely what I said.
//Logically: I don’t know. We have been over this before. Just because we cannot answer why God decided to do this or that is not a problem, it is simply a spehere inn which God has not revealed himself. I already said this to you a long time ago…//
I realize we have been over this before, but my argument is not simply that you have no answer. It’s that on your view, no answer is even possible. The problem isn’t a lack of knowledge, but rather the lack of the very possibility of knowledge. Thus, when you attempt the following tu quoque, it’s disanalogous:
//I believe that this world is chronologically necessary not logically necessary. I think you believe that it is both. Thus in order for your argument to be consistent, you must provide the logical reason why God chose one man over another for salvation. If one must know every reason behind God’s volitions to escape arbitrarity, then you must explain the logical reason why God chose one man over another to be his elect.//
This isn’t true. I merely have to assert that there *is* a reason in order for my defense to hold. The difference is that there is a possible answer to your question about my view – viz. whatever God’s reason is – whereas I assert you cannot even provide a possible answer to my criticism of your view, as any reason proffered as to why God instantiated this reality rather than another which would likewise have been agreeable to His nature would beg the question as to whether said reason was itself only merely agreeable to His nature or actually necessitated by it. And so on. It’s arbitrarity or logical necessity. It can’t be both.
//And I replied that your statement itself is meaningless, because you are making God a world.//
Recall that I switched to calling it a “possible reality” to avoid this and following objections. “Possible world” is simply the colloquial nomenclature.
//Did I? Where? I thought I challenged the meaning of your premise every time.//
Not at all. As you noted above, you said God’s will must be agreeable to (i.e. consistent with) His nature.
//The exact phrase I responded to was, “but I assert that creation is not consubstantial with the Father because the Father did not [and, therefore, could not”. Here we have activity (Which I use synonymously with existence IN THIS CONTEXT), “the Father did”, with nature and will, “could not”. I don’t think you have fairly faced the argument.//
The Father did not *because* He could not. There is a clear distinction between a cause and an effect.
//Because on my view eternal generation and spiration are the means/channels/relation, by which the communication is made. If they already have the communication logically before the eternal generation and spiration, there is no need for these activities. They are arbitrarily thrown into the mix to make it look like the Christian view.//
Recall I am saying that the Son and Spirit are said to be generated and spirated *because* God “causes” them. I understand you have it the other way around, but you have to respond to my view – or, at least, what I can possibly appeal to – on my terms, not yours.
//Which you have already admitted to…//
True. But I also said that “I would need more than just “that’s Plotinian” or pagan.” Otherwise, the argument is purely guilt by association. Now, there is a sense in which, on my view, God depends on creation, and insofar as this is true, there is a sense in which He is not self-sufficient. But I don’t think the senses in which these things are true is significant, for while there is only one possible “reality” consistent with God’s nature, it is the reality which fit the nature rather than the nature which must fit the reality. There is a logical as well as metaphysical dependence of [the ideas about] creation on God. The only sense in which God may be said to depend on creation is that His nature is such that He necessarily creates, in which case the implication is that God would not be who He is if He did not create. Maybe there is a problem in saying this, but if so, I will need to have it teased out for me. Furthermore, however, how is this significantly different from your view in which the Son and Spirit are necessary according to God’s nature? You say:
//No, it is not pagan because as you admit, the Son is not a creature, he is eternal. But wait, we have already established though, that the Son is consubstantial with the Father.//
I don’t see how that is relevant to the question of why God is meaningfully self-sufficient on your view but not on mine. God’s attributes “depend” on the Son and Spirit on your view in the same sense they would depend on the Son, Spirit, and creation in mine. In both cases, there is something that necessary according to His nature. True, on my view, it is the Son, Spirit, and everything else, whereas on your view, it is the Son and the Spirit alone. But this is just a variation in the quantity of what is necessary according to His nature. So if God is not self-sufficient in a meaningful sense on my view, then by parity of reasoning, neither is He self-sufficient in a meaningful sense on yours. Then again, you would seem to attribute significance to such a “dependency,” whereas I consider it trivial.
//First of all, my argument (Which is the same as my argument regarding divine infinity), is that an absolute necessity to create extending from the divine nature (ANC), requires that the meaning of the attributes, their definition, is dependent on a creation. A dependence, not in the order of existing in the genus of being, but a logical order in the genus of epistemology. Thus this logical dependency, requires that the objects juxtaposed to the attributes, must always be so juxtaposed in order that the attributes may be so defined. Thus the creation must also be eternal.//
A few points. Firstly, the ideas after which creation is patterned are eternal, not creation itself – when I speak of creation, I always speak ontologically. Secondly, the meaning or definition of the divine attributes do not require or depend on a creation. Rather, the collective possession of these attributes requires or depends on creation, though only in the sense that one who possesses them will thereby necessarily create. I confess I don’t see the problem in stating this.
//But that knowledge depends on a genus of being, an order of existing which begins with the mind of the Father…In the genus of epistemology sure, and I know these two genuses have some overlap, but the “existence” of the Father’s mind, makes all that epistemology possible in the order of existing.//
I agree, but I don’t see how this is relevant to my analogy.
“But that which God wills is not necessarily necessary according to His nature”
>>I read according to, to mean agreeable to, my mistake.
“The problem isn’t a lack of knowledge, but rather the lack of the very possibility of knowledge. Thus, when you attempt the following tu quoque, it’s disanalogous:”
>>>Assertion.
“This isn’t true. I merely have to assert that there *is* a reason in order for my defense to hold. The difference is that there is a possible answer to your question about my view – viz. whatever God’s reason is – whereas I assert you cannot even provide a possible answer to my criticism of your view, as any reason proffered as to why God instantiated this reality rather than another which would likewise have been agreeable to His nature would beg the question as to whether said reason was itself only merely agreeable to His nature or actually necessitated by it. And so on. It’s arbitrarity or logical necessity. It can’t be both.”
>>>Assertion.
“The Father did not *because* He could not. There is a clear distinction between a cause and an effect.”
>>>Thus nature is compelled. That is Plotinus’ emenationism, as clear as day.
“Recall I am saying that the Son and Spirit are said to be generated and spirated *because* God “causes” them. I understand you have it the other way around, but you have to respond to my view – or, at least, what I can possibly appeal to – on my terms, not yours.”
>>>That is incoherent. God causes them because he causes them. You have yet to show the necessity of the eternal generation and spiration.
“True. But I also said that “I would need more than just “that’s Plotinian” or pagan.” ”
>>>Wo hold on. Are suggesting that God’s mercy, in the genus of epistemology is dependent on him showing mercy to creatures? That the good is dependent on the evil?
“Now, there is a sense in which, on my view, God depends on creation, and insofar as this is true, there is a sense in which He is not self-sufficient. But I don’t think the senses in which these things are true is significant, for while there is only one possible “reality” consistent with God’s nature, it is the reality which fit the nature rather than the nature which must fit the reality.”
>>>I think that is heterodox but only by way of logical deduction is it heresy and that is not grounds for separation, so I would commune with you.
“I don’t see how that is relevant to the question of why God is meaningfully self-sufficient on your view but not on mine.”
>>>Because, on your view the genus of being, or the order of existing is the same thing as the genus of epistemology-meaning-essence. Thus essence=existence on your view and that is ads, a conflation of nature-will and activity- That is monadism. It is emanationism.
“God’s attributes “depend” on the Son and Spirit on your view in the same sense they would depend on the Son, Spirit, and creation in mine.”
>>>No God’s properties have a meaningful dependency, not in the genus of being. I am still not convinced that you have distinguished nature-will-and activity enough to make a distinction between genus of being dependencies and genus of epistemology dependencies.
“Secondly, the meaning or definition of the divine attributes do not require or depend on a creation.”
WTH? I thought we established that the dependency which you ascribe to the attributes is in the genus of epistemology, thus the meaning of the attributes. You are appealing to another genus other than being and epistemology here.
I don’t understand what you mean by this: “Rather, the collective possession of these attributes requires or depends on creation, though only in the sense that one who possesses them will thereby necessarily create. I confess I don’t see the problem in stating this.”
“
//Assertion.//
I don’t think so. I said: I assert you cannot even provide a possible answer to my criticism of your view, as any reason proffered as to why God instantiated this reality rather than another which would likewise have been agreeable to His nature would beg the question as to whether said reason was itself only merely agreeable to His nature or actually necessitated by it. If the latter, you admit that this world is necessary according to God’s nature. If the former, the criticism of arbitrarity is repeated: why did God choose one reason for instantiating this possible reality over against another reason which would have instantiated another possible reality if both are agreeable to His nature? Your answer will eventually have to terminate on necessity according to God’s nature or I can ask this series of questions ad infinitum,
//Thus nature is compelled. That is Plotinus’ emenationism, as clear as day.//
Rather, God’s nature compels. Creation is necessitated by who God is. God is not necessitated by what creation is.
//That is incoherent. God causes them because he causes them. You have yet to show the necessity of the eternal generation and spiration.//
It’s not incoherent: God “causes” (communicates divinity to) them because such maximally manifests His glory, the teleological end of all things. And what do you mean by show? I have shown it insofar as I have shown only two persons have had divine nature communicated to them, which is that according to which I am suggesting we can determine who has been eternally generated or spirated.
//Wo hold on. Are suggesting that God’s mercy, in the genus of epistemology is dependent on him showing mercy to creatures? That the good is dependent on the evil?//
Define “dependent.” For God exists, was good, and was merciful anterior to creation. But that isn’t relevant to whether God could have been such if He had never created. But I prefer to correlate creation with divine wisdom (Ephesians 3:8-10) rather than mercy.
//I think that is heterodox but only by way of logical deduction is it heresy and that is not grounds for separation, so I would commune with you.//
Well, I would certainly reject the label of pagan or Plotinian.
//Because, on your view the genus of being, or the order of existing is the same thing as the genus of epistemology-meaning-essence. Thus essence=existence on your view and that is ads, a conflation of nature-will and activity- That is monadism. It is emanationism.//
Where did I say they were the same? In fact, I thought we agreed some time ago that Scripturalism does not entail idealism.
//No God’s properties have a meaningful dependency, not in the genus of being. I am still not convinced that you have distinguished nature-will-and activity enough to make a distinction between genus of being dependencies and genus of epistemology dependencies.//
Perhaps not. But my point does not merely pertain to the property of Fatherhood. You maintain that the Son and Spirit are necessary *according to the nature of God,* right? But you fault me for denying divine sufficiency in favor of divine dependency when I say that about creation. Well, why do you think divine sufficiency and dependency is relevant when talking about whether creation is necessary according to the nature of God but not when talking about whether the Son and Spirit are necessary according to the nature of God? Because that parallel would imply you too must deny divine sufficiency in favor of divine dependency (in some sense).
//WTH? I thought we established that the dependency which you ascribe to the attributes is in the genus of epistemology, thus the meaning of the attributes. You are appealing to another genus other than being and epistemology here.//
Think of it this way: how do you define faith? As active assent to the truth [of the gospel], right? This definition doesn’t depend on justification, though it necessitates justification. Analogously, I can define, say, goodness as character disposed and actions intended to maximally manifest God’s glory. This definition doesn’t depend on what actions God wills, though I argue it along with God’s possession of all the other divine attributes determine His nature to choose the only possible reality consistent with them. That’s what I meant.
“why did God choose one reason for instantiating this possible reality over against another reason which would have instantiated another possible reality if both are agreeable to His nature? Your answer will eventually have to terminate on necessity according to God’s nature or I can ask this series of questions ad infinitum”
>>>I have no idea. My ignorance is due to lack of revelation. You have yet to prove that an answer is impossible. I have shown that your view is scripturally impossible.
Psalm 16:2 O my soul, thou hast said unto the LORD, Thou art my Lord: my goodness extendeth not to thee;
Job 35:6 If thou sinnest, what doest thou against him? or if thy transgressions be multiplied, what doest thou unto him? 7 If thou be righteous, what givest thou him? or what receiveth he of thine hand? Kjv
On your view God’s attributes are meaningfully dependent on a creation, which is exactly what both of these passages deny.
“Rather, God’s nature compels. Creation is necessitated by who God is. God is not necessitated by what creation is.”
>>>That denies creation ex nihilo. You are right in the middle of the finite-infinite Neoplatonic dialectic here. https://eternalpropositions.wordpress.com/2012/11/04/divine-infinity-the-pagan-dialectic-denial-of-creation-ex-nihilo-and-idolatry-connected/
First, the statement, “Creation is necessitated by who God is” pertains to the genus of epistemology. The statement, “God is not necessitated by what creation is”, pertains to the order of existing in the genus of being. You are conflating and thus equivocating by your meaning of necessitated. I said above I thought you were conflating these categories and I think I was right. I understand you have not outright stated it but I think your system implies it, thus this is my reply to your statement: “Where did I say they were the same? In fact, I thought we agreed some time ago that Scripturalism does not entail idealism.”.
Thus, on your view the finite is necessitated by what the infinite is. The infinite is NOT-finite, thus meaningfully dependent on the finite. The juxtaposition requires that both be eternal, thus emanationism and not creationism. This is Neoplatonism-full out.
“It’s not incoherent: God “causes” (communicates divinity to) them because such maximally manifests His glory, the teleological end of all things.”
>>>But wait, that is why you said God created the world. Notice how the created finite objects have been elevated to the same significance as the divine persons. Maybe my suspicions were right.
“And what do you mean by show?”
>>>Demonstrate.
“I have shown it insofar as I have shown only two persons have had divine nature communicated to them, which is that according to which I am suggesting we can determine who has been eternally generated or spirated.”
>>>So you determine who is consubstantial by asking, who has been eternally caused. But wait, that was not my question. My question was, what is the necessity of the eternal generation and spiration? You are pointing to circumstances pertaining to these two persons. You are not pointing to their essence. That is, you are making an action that they performed the qualification for divinity. But I could ask, who has died on the cross to propitiate God’s wrath? Whoever did that is divine. But now I have conflated the economy with the ontological trinity. That activity is circumstantial and accidental to his divinity. Is that the same with eternal generation and spiration?
“Define “dependent.”
>>>The meaning of God’s attributes, and thus their essence is dependent on their juxtaposition to creatures. You have already admitted that God is depenbdent on creation. You said:
“Now, there is a sense in which, on my view, God depends on creation, and insofar as this is true, there is a sense in which He is not self-sufficient.”
>>>Now I agree that there is a dependency of the meaning of the Father’s hypostasis on the Son, but that is no problem for me, because I fully acknowledge that the Son is consubstantial with the Father and co-eternal with him. That juxtaposition falls perfectly consistent with my Cosmology. However, your juxtaposition includes creatures.
“For God exists, was good, and was merciful anterior to creation.”
>>>Then ipso facto, his attributes are not meaningfully dependent on creation.
“But that isn’t relevant to whether God could have been such if He had never created.”
>>>That is yours to explain.
“Perhaps not. But my point does not merely pertain to the property of Fatherhood. You maintain that the Son and Spirit are necessary *according to the nature of God,* right?”
>>>Technically it is his hypostasis but I understand what is meant when people say this. It just means they are not creatures.
“But you fault me for denying divine sufficiency in favor of divine dependency when I say that about creation.”
>>>Because creation is not consubstantial with God. The Son and HS are.
“Think of it this way: how do you define faith? As active assent to the truth [of the gospel], right?”
>>>Yes, I am a Clarkian.
“This definition doesn’t depend on justification, though it necessitates justification.”
>>>Only persons can have dependencies in the historical order. Definitions can only have logical dependencies. I think you are conflating a definition in the genus of epistemology, with an action, justification, in the genus of being-historical order.
This gives more support to my accusation that you are conflating these two categories.
If you meant to say, that this activity, assenting to gospel propositions, doesn’t chronologically depend on justification, I’m confused because I was under the impression, that all this was simultaneous.
Analogously, I can define, say, goodness as character disposed and actions intended to maximally manifest God’s glory. This definition doesn’t depend on what actions God wills”
>>If you mean that that action of goodness doesn’t depend on what actions God wills, you are an open theist. If you mean that that definition doesn’t depend on what actions God wills, you are conflating the genus of epistemology, with the genus of being.
“I have no idea. My ignorance is due to lack of revelation. You have yet to prove that an answer is impossible.”
I mean that for you, there is no possible answer. I have already shown why multiple times now: either God’s reason for willing was necessary according to His nature or it wasn’t. You say it wasn’t. So you’re left with the idea that logically, God could have willed to instantiate some other reality agreeable to His nature. Thus, this possible reality was willed arbitrarily relative to that alternate possible reality, for any reason you could possibly appeal to would itself be likewise arbitrary relative to some other reason which would have been agreeable to God’s nature (else, necessity according to God’s nature). This all follows quite simply.
The KJV rendering of Psalm 16:2 is not clear. The ESV, NASB, NKJV, etc. make it clear that the goodness in question is that possessed by the speaker, not God. Job 35:6-7 just shows that creation does not compensate for any alleged deficiency in God, which was the point of my own article.
//That denies creation ex nihilo.//
That only follows if, in accordance with what you write in your article, I can only define God as “the not-this.” But that’s a blatant distortion of my view. I have never ascribed to apophatic theology.
//First, the statement, “Creation is necessitated by who God is” pertains to the genus of epistemology. The statement, “God is not necessitated by what creation is”, pertains to the order of existing in the genus of being.//
The idea I am conflating epistemology with ontology is an assumption. It rather seems to me that I have covered all my bases. God is not necessitated by the idea of creation, nor is He necessitated by the ontology of creation. Neither makes sense. In both cases – the idea and the ontology – creation is necessitated by God.
//Thus, on your view the finite is necessitated by what the infinite is. The infinite is NOT-finite, thus meaningfully dependent on the finite. The juxtaposition requires that both be eternal, thus emanationism and not creationism. This is Neoplatonism-full out.//
Most if not all ideas are eternal – I am not yet convinced that the A-series of time is not true, in which case there may be temporally indexed ideas which are obviously not eternal. But there is a logical contingency among ideas. Certain ideas follow from others. I am saying that all ideas follow from the idea of God. But then, the idea of God – let alone the existence of God – cannot follow from [the ideas pertaining to] creation. Further, I don’t need to resort to apophatic theology to define God. The “infinite” (whatever that means) may indeed be the “not-finite,” but that would be by definition. You would hold to that as well as I would, if you held to divine infinity. But the fact we can contrast things to God does not imply we can’t speak of God without resorting to distinctions from creation. I can easily distinguish God from all other subjects by referring to Him as the Father of the divine Son. I have individuated the Father without mentioning creation.
//But wait, that is why you said God created the world. Notice how the created finite objects have been elevated to the same significance as the divine persons. Maybe my suspicions were right.//
You are presupposing that divinity is communicated to whatsoever is necessitated according to God’s nature. And in the process, you are avoiding the legitimacy of my answer.
//Demonstrate.//
I don’t have to. I don’t have to explain how something functions toward the maximal manifestation of God’s glory. I can appeal to ignorance because on my view, there is a possible answer. I don’t mind the ignorance card being played, but it can’t be played when any possible answer would lead to contradiction.
//You are pointing to circumstances pertaining to these two persons. You are not pointing to their essence. That is, you are making an action that they performed the qualification for divinity.//
No, I’m not, and you haven’t even remotely supported that inference. I’m making an action the *Father* performed the qualification for the divinity of that which is necessitated by His nature, viz. all other things. His communication of divinity to the Son and Spirit is why they are to be qualified as divine (and eternally generated or spirated), not any of the activity each of these persons performs. I have no idea where you got that from.
“The meaning of God’s attributes, and thus their essence is dependent on their juxtaposition to creatures. You have already admitted that God is depenbdent on creation.”
But not in this sense you are attributing to me.
//Now I agree that there is a dependency of the meaning of the Father’s hypostasis on the Son, but that is no problem for me, because I fully acknowledge that the Son is consubstantial with the Father and co-eternal with him. That juxtaposition falls perfectly consistent with my Cosmology. However, your juxtaposition includes creatures.//
You are misrepresenting my parallel. I’m not talking about the personal properties of the Father, I’m talking about the nature of the Father. Do you think the meaning of the divine nature depends on the Son? If not, then the fact the Father’s nature necessitates the Son and Spirit [and possibly creation] is irrelevant.
//Then ipso facto, his attributes are not meaningfully dependent on creation.//
Great. That means you can rescind your criticism.
//That is yours to explain.//
I have been saying that who God is necessitates what He wills. But the thing which is willed (ontology) and the ideas pertaining to that thing (epistemology) are both dependent on God (ontology) and the ideas pertaining to God (epistemology). God is anterior to that which is derived in every sense of the word. So any “dependency” isn’t really significant, as it just means that no other imaginable reality could be instantiated consistent with God’s nature. I repeat: this fact – that no other imaginable reality could be instantiated consistent with God’s nature – does not change the fact that God is anterior to that which is derived in every sense of the word.
//Because creation is not consubstantial with God. The Son and HS are.//
How is that relevant?
“This definition doesn’t depend on justification, though it necessitates justification.”
//Only persons can have dependencies in the historical order. Definitions can only have logical dependencies. I think you are conflating a definition in the genus of epistemology, with an action, justification, in the genus of being-historical order.//
Then you are going to have to make your criticism that “The meaning of God’s attributes, and thus their essence is dependent on their juxtaposition to creatures.” I was under the impression this was epistemological, since we’re talking about meaning. But I have just provided a case wherein the meaning of faith is not dependent on the meaning of justification (epistemology) although one’s possession of faith will necessitate his justification (ontology). Also, I don’t think the historical order has any relevance to this analogy. It does seem we are somehow talking past each other, though.
//If you mean that that definition doesn’t depend on what actions God wills, you are conflating the genus of epistemology, with the genus of being.//
How?
“I mean that for you, there is no possible answer.”
>>>I understand that is your assertion about me. That has yet to be proved by argumentation.
“I have already shown why multiple times now: either God’s reason for willing was necessary according to His nature or it wasn’t. You say it wasn’t. So you’re left with the idea that logically, God could have willed to instantiate some other reality agreeable to His nature.”
>>>Notice you have already admitted an element that those who say it is arbitrary do not affirm, namely, agreeability to nature. There is then a nature that must agree with the will. Nominalists who affirm arbitrary volitions reject this.
“Thus, this possible reality was willed arbitrarily relative to that alternate possible reality, for any reason you could possibly appeal to”
>>>No, an arbitrary decision of the will would be a decision to create lawless human beings. That would be a decision of the will that does not take the nature into consideration. I have met these people and they call themselves Calvinists. They say that if God willed it idolatry would be good.
“The KJV rendering of Psalm 16:2 is not clear. The ESV, NASB, NKJV, etc. make it clear that the goodness in question is that possessed by the speaker, not God.”
>>>THAT IS THE WHOLE POINT. The point is creation does not affect God’s attributes! The essence of God’s attributes are not affected or dependent on creation.
But that is exactly of what your system says.
“Job 35:6-7 just shows that creation does not compensate for any alleged deficiency in God, which was the point of my own article.”
Again, the point is creation does not affect God’s attributes! The essence of God’s attributes are not affected or dependent on creation. Both of these passages teach this in direct opposition to your system.
“That only follows if, in accordance with what you write in your article, I can only define God as “the not-this.” But that’s a blatant distortion of my view. I have never ascribed to apophatic theology.”
>>>The same juxtaposition underlies your system. Your system says that the meaning of God’s attributes depends on creation. Thus, either God’s attributes are eternally juxtaposed to the creation, and thus the created are ipso facto emanations, or God’s attributes only take meaning in time. Thus their meaning is created and thus their essence is created.
//First, the statement, “Creation is necessitated by who God is” pertains to the genus of epistemology. The statement, “God is not necessitated by what creation is”, pertains to the order of existing in the genus of being.//
“The idea I am conflating epistemology with ontology is an assumption.”
>>>I just spelled it out for you.
“God is not necessitated by the idea of creation, nor is He necessitated by the ontology of creation.”
>>>I think you re confused. The idea of Creation in Gods mind is ontological. If you meant that God is not compelled by the meaning of creation, I would strongly disagree for the reasons given above which affirm that the meaning of God’s attributes are created in time.
“Neither makes sense. In both cases – the idea and the ontology – creation is necessitated by God.”
>>>Eternally, else the attributes have no meaning in eternity. Thus creation is eternal.
//But wait, that is why you said God created the world. Notice how the created finite objects have been elevated to the same significance as the divine persons. Maybe my suspicions were right.//
You are presupposing that divinity is communicated to whatsoever is necessitated according to God’s nature. And in the process, you are avoiding the legitimacy of my answer.”
>>>You are avoiding the argument. Have you or have you not made the significance of creation equal to the divine persons? I strongly believe you have.
//Demonstrate.//
I don’t have to. I don’t have to explain how something functions toward the maximal manifestation of God’s glory.”
>>>That is not what I asked. I did not inquire into the effects of an activity. I asked for the necessity of the activity, simpliciter.
“I can appeal to ignorance because on my view, there is a possible answer.”
>>>This is becoming tiresome. You just keep asserting that my view has no possible answer while yours does while you don’t give the answer.
“I don’t mind the ignorance card being played, but it can’t be played when any possible answer would lead to contradiction.”
>>>You have yet to show that contradiction.
“No, I’m not, and you haven’t even remotely supported that inference. I’m making an action the *Father* performed the qualification for the divinity of that which is necessitated by His nature, viz. all other things. His communication of divinity to the Son and Spirit is why they are to be qualified as divine (and eternally generated or spirated), not any of the activity each of these persons performs. I have no idea where you got that from.”
You left out the next statement from that quote:
“But I could ask, who has died on the cross to propitiate God’s wrath? Whoever did that is divine. But now I have conflated the economy with the ontological trinity. That activity is circumstantial and accidental to his divinity. Is that the same with eternal generation and spiration?”
You completely avoided this as you have done with many issues here: The supposed arbitrarity in electing one man over another and the juxtaposition to name a couple.
“The meaning of God’s attributes, and thus their essence is dependent on their juxtaposition to creatures. You have already admitted that God is depenbdent on creation.”
But not in this sense you are attributing to me.”
>>>There it is again. I have already given you an opportunity to speak to this and you have avoided it. From above:
“WTH? I thought we established that the dependency which you ascribe to the attributes is in the genus of epistemology, thus the meaning of the attributes. You are appealing to another genus other than being and epistemology here.”
//Now I agree that there is a dependency of the meaning of the Father’s hypostasis on the Son, but that is no problem for me, because I fully acknowledge that the Son is consubstantial with the Father and co-eternal with him. That juxtaposition falls perfectly consistent with my Cosmology. However, your juxtaposition includes creatures.//
“You are misrepresenting my parallel. I’m not talking about the personal properties of the Father, I’m talking about the nature of the Father. Do you think the meaning of the divine nature depends on the Son?”
>>>No.
“If not, then the fact the Father’s nature necessitates the Son and Spirit [and possibly creation] is irrelevant.”
>>I never said “the Father’s nature necessitates the Son and Spirit”.
“//Then ipso facto, his attributes are not meaningfully dependent on creation.//
Great. That means you can rescind your criticism.”
>>>But that only begs the question: What is the dependency on creation that you apply to God’s attributes?
//That is yours to explain.//
“So any “dependency” isn’t really significant, as it just means that no other imaginable reality could be instantiated consistent with God’s nature. I repeat: this fact – that no other imaginable reality could be instantiated consistent with God’s nature – does not change the fact that God is anterior to that which is derived in every sense of the word.”
>>>Plotinus could say the exact same thing about the One.
//Because creation is not consubstantial with God. The Son and HS are.//
How is that relevant?”
>>>The juxtaposition argument above.
“This definition doesn’t depend on justification, though it necessitates justification.”
//Only persons can have dependencies in the historical order. Definitions can only have logical dependencies. I think you are conflating a definition in the genus of epistemology, with an action, justification, in the genus of being-historical order.//
Then you are going to have to make your criticism that “The meaning of God’s attributes, and thus their essence is dependent on their juxtaposition to creatures.”
>>>I have above in the juxtaposition argument.
“I was under the impression this was epistemological, since we’re talking about meaning. But I have just provided a case wherein the meaning of faith is not dependent on the meaning of justification (epistemology) although one’s possession of faith will necessitate his justification (ontology). Also, I don’t think the historical order has any relevance to this analogy. It does seem we are somehow talking past each other, though.”
>>>This argument above has totally lost me.
//If you mean that that definition doesn’t depend on what actions God wills, you are conflating the genus of epistemology, with the genus of being.//
How?”
>>Definition pertains to the genus of epistemology-the logical order. Actions pertain to historical order.
//Notice you have already admitted an element that those who say it is arbitrary do not affirm, namely, agreeability to nature. There is then a nature that must agree with the will. Nominalists who affirm arbitrary volitions reject this.//
Noting their problem does not absolve you of your difficulty.
//No, an arbitrary decision of the will would be a decision to create lawless human beings. That would be a decision of the will that does not take the nature into consideration. I have met these people and they call themselves Calvinists. They say that if God willed it idolatry would be good.//
There was no reason for God to have instantiated this possible reality over the possible reality in which He never created since both are agreeable to His nature: hence, arbitrarity. You know this is the criticism, not the one you mentioned, so you need to deal with this criticism, not that one.
//THAT IS THE WHOLE POINT. The point is creation does not affect God’s attributes! The essence of God’s attributes are not affected or dependent on creation.//
The speaker isn’t God. God’s goodness isn’t even in question in Psalm 16:2 – “My goodness is nothing apart from You.” “My” is not “God.” It’s David. So it’s not relevant to how God’s goodness relates to creation.
//Again, the point is creation does not affect God’s attributes! The essence of God’s attributes are not affected or dependent on creation. Both of these passages teach this in direct opposition to your system.//
Rather, it is opposed to what you think my system implies. But the sense in which I admit God is dependent on creation is not that which you would have me believe.
//The same juxtaposition underlies your system. Your system says that the meaning of God’s attributes depends on creation. Thus, either God’s attributes are eternally juxtaposed to the creation, and thus the created are ipso facto emanations, or God’s attributes only take meaning in time. Thus their meaning is created and thus their essence is created.//
Or the eternal meaning of God’s attributes can determine what He chooses by eternally eliminating whatever possibilities would be inconsistent with His attributes. The idea of God’s attributes and the idea of creation may both be eternal, but the latter is predicated on the former, as I’ve shown, and as I’ve already said I only speak of “creation” per se in the ontological sense, the idea that creation per se rather than the idea of creation is “eternally juxtaposed” is pure assertion.
//I just spelled it out for you.//
If the above is what you meant, I remain unconvinced. We may be at an impasse at this point.
//I think you re confused. The idea of Creation in Gods mind is ontological.//
Howso? Again, if we reject idealism, this cannot be the case.
//If you meant that God is not compelled by the meaning of creation, I would strongly disagree for the reasons given above which affirm that the meaning of God’s attributes are created in time.//
God is compelled by His nature. His nature compels the creation of that which alone is consistent with His nature. In fact, the meaning of His nature is a precondition for determining what is consistent with it, so the idea that [the idea of] creation could determine the meaning of the nature is nonsense. We are going in circles.
//Eternally, else the attributes have no meaning in eternity. Thus creation is eternal.//
Again, the implicit assumption is that on my view, the meaning of the attributes somehow depends on creation. I have not seen you show this.
//You are avoiding the argument. Have you or have you not made the significance of creation equal to the divine persons? I strongly believe you have.//
Everything necessitated is to the glory of God, but there are more fundamental principles within that set, so to speak, and the Son and Spirit, insofar as they proximately cause other necessities, are more significant.
//That is not what I asked. I did not inquire into the effects of an activity. I asked for the necessity of the activity, simpliciter.//
But I can give the same answer to that question.
//This is becoming tiresome. You just keep asserting that my view has no possible answer while yours does while you don’t give the answer.//
The difference is I have used disjunctive reasoning to show what the consequences are of a view which rejects that all things are necessitate according to God’s nature. You have not done the same.
//You left out the next statement from that quote//
Because I never brought up economic activity as a qualifier for divinity. You may like me to or actually think I hold that, but I don’t.
//There it is again. I have already given you an opportunity to speak to this and you have avoided it. From above:
“WTH? I thought we established that the dependency which you ascribe to the attributes is in the genus of epistemology, thus the meaning of the attributes. You are appealing to another genus other than being and epistemology here.”//
We have not established that, no. In fact, I have shown several times now that creation and the ideas pertaining to creation are dependent on God. I see you skipped this in your reply: “I have been saying that who God is necessitates what He wills. But the thing which is willed (ontology) and the ideas pertaining to that thing (epistemology) are both dependent on God (ontology) and the ideas pertaining to God (epistemology). God is anterior to that which is derived in every sense of the word. So any “dependency” isn’t really significant, as it just means that no other imaginable reality could be instantiated consistent with God’s nature. I repeat: this fact – that no other imaginable reality could be instantiated consistent with God’s nature – does not change the fact that God is anterior to that which is derived in every sense of the word.”
//I never said “the Father’s nature necessitates the Son and Spirit”.//
Well, do you or don’t you believe that? If you do, you have to deal with my inference.
//But that only begs the question: What is the dependency on creation that you apply to God’s attributes?//
That since there is only one possible [idea of] reality consistent with God’s nature – determined by God’s nature – that is the only possible reality which can be effected. As I said, this is trivial.
//Plotinus could say the exact same thing about the One.//
Irrelevant.
//This argument above has totally lost me.//
It seems clear to me? What faith means does not depend on what justification means. Meaning pertains to epistemology. Ontologically, faith necessitates justification. One who possesses faith is justified. So the fact one thing may necessitate another doesn’t ipso facto mean that what is necessitated determines the meaning of that which necessitates. That’s the point of the analogy.
//Definition pertains to the genus of epistemology-the logical order. Actions pertain to historical order.//
I agree, but then I don’t see how your mention of the genus of epistemology and ontology is relevant.
Anyway, this is going to be my last reply for now.
//Notice you have already admitted an element that those who say it is arbitrary do not affirm, namely, agreeability to nature. There is then a nature that must agree with the will. Nominalists who affirm arbitrary volitions reject this.//
Noting their problem does not absolve you of your difficulty.”
>>>What difficulty? My view of creation takes a real divine nature into consideration. That is by definition not arbitrary.
“There was no reason for God to have instantiated this possible reality over the possible reality in which He never created since both are agreeable to His nature: hence, arbitrarity.”
>>>Typing out the same statement over and over again does not make it more true Ryan. You are using a definition of arbitrary that is unprovable. One: a never created option is not another possible world or reality other than God. We have been over and over this.
“You know this is the criticism, not the one you mentioned, so you need to deal with this criticism, not that one.”
>>>Would you seriously like for me to catalog how many times I have answered this?
//THAT IS THE WHOLE POINT. The point is creation does not affect God’s attributes! The essence of God’s attributes are not affected or dependent on creation.//
“The speaker isn’t God. God’s goodness isn’t even in question in Psalm 16:2 – “My goodness is nothing apart from You.” “My” is not “God.” It’s David. So it’s not relevant to how God’s goodness relates to creation.”
>>>I don’t think you have faced the argument yet. I have already admitted the speaker isn’t God. That is the whole point. Both passages are impossibly interpreted on your system.
“Rather, it is opposed to what you think my system implies. But the sense in which I admit God is dependent on creation is not that which you would have me believe.”
>>>You have yet to define what in fact the dependency is. For a while I was under the impression that it pertained to the genus of epistemology because that was in fact the parallel you drew between my view of the Father’s dependency on the Son. I admit clearly that the dependency that the Father’s person has on the son pertains to the genus of epistemology.
//I think you re confused. The idea of Creation in Gods mind is ontological.//
Howso? Again, if we reject idealism, this cannot be the case.”
>>>I believe that Creation is something ad extra from God. By the idea of creation, I am thinking of the Ideas in God’s mind, that provide the arche from which all temporal things are patterned after. These are objects in God’s mind, in the genus of being.
Continuing from the previous article on these issues,
“This idea, I take to be a set of propositions. These propositions take form in time. They provide the pattern of a created form. The created form is and is not a set of propositions, in distinct senses. It is, in the sense that the set of propositions for Drake, exist as realities in the mind of God in their own eternal mode, but with reference to me, they are virtual while my created physical form and my rational faculty are the temporal actuality. That is, I am a set of propositions in the sense that I participate in and am patterned after this set of propositions. That set is my definition.
I am not a set of propositions in the sense that my created form is something physical, not something intellectual. What is then something physical? I don’t know positively. My knowledge of the created world is only negative. The operational definition of physical is “that which can be measured”. So what about your rational faculty? That can’t be measured. How do you distinguish between the eternal propositions from your rational faculty that thinks these propositions? Well, the question itself explains it. My rational faculty is just that, a faculty.
Therefore, there is a sense in which all things are sets of propositions. However, that does not mean that the metaphysical explanation of things terminates upon the intellectual/propositional. There is an aspect to created things that is not subject to definition. Therefore, I take the opposite position from the tradition of Pseudo Dionysius and the Scholastics where GOD is not subject to definition (Therefore knowledge of God is only negative), but the created world is most definitely an object of knowledge and an utter obsession. I affirm that God has revealed himself but has not given us much information about the created world.”
“God is compelled by His nature. His nature compels the creation of that which alone is consistent with His nature.”
>>>I could not find a clearer admission that there is no will in your God. It is all nature. This is Plotinus. A compelled nature is by definition, an emanating monad.
Gordon Clark,
“The Christian view of things also seems to resemble a dualism: At least the world and God may be called two ‘substances’ ; neither one is the substance of the other. But actually Christianity is more successfully monistic than Neoplatonism was. God alone is the eternal substance, the independent principle’ apart from creation of the world nothing exists besides him. This underlines the essential and controversial elements of the Hebrew-Christian doctrine. First, as Creator, God is viewed, not as an undifferentiated One that produces a world by necessity, but as a living mind who with foreknowledge created voluntarily. Plotinus explicitly denied will to his One; but will is one of the most prominent aspects of the Biblical Deity.” Thales to Dewey, pg. 189
“In fact, the meaning of His nature is a precondition for determining what is consistent with it”
>>>On our side of the relation.
“so the idea that [the idea of] creation could determine the meaning of the nature is nonsense.”
>>>I agree. The idea of creation in eternity is not something that God affirms of himself. It is something that provides the arche for the physical creation in time. However, you are still faced with a big problem. If the idea of creation is not affirmed by God of himself, then it cannot be a necessity of nature.
“Again, the implicit assumption is that on my view, the meaning of the attributes somehow depends on creation. I have not seen you show this.”
>>>You have admitted that this is the case. You admitted that the attributes depend on creation in some sense. You said, “Now, there is a sense in which, on my view, God depends on creation, and insofar as this is true, there is a sense in which He is not self-sufficient.”
//You are avoiding the argument. Have you or have you not made the significance of creation equal to the divine persons? I strongly believe you have.//
Everything necessitated is to the glory of God, but there are more fundamental principles within that set, so to speak, and the Son and Spirit, insofar as they proximately cause other necessities, are more significant.”
>>>That is ad hoc. Asserting it does not explain it.
//That is not what I asked. I did not inquire into the effects of an activity. I asked for the necessity of the activity, simpliciter.//
But I can give the same answer to that question.”
>>>So your answer to the question, why must the Son and HS emanate from the Father, your answer is for God’s glory. Notice, it does not pertain to the communication of divine nature. Yet again, we have the Son and HS either brought down to the significance of creatures or we have the creatures brought up to the significance of the Son and HS.
“The difference is I have used disjunctive reasoning to show what the consequences are of a view which rejects that all things are necessitate according to God’s nature. You have not done the same.”
>>>Your conclusion has no representation in the premises.
Here is your syllogism:
Either the creation is necessary or not necessary.
The creation is not necessary.
Conclusion: The Creation is arbitrary.
In order to have a valid conclusion, you must find it in the previous premises.
//You left out the next statement from that quote//
Because I never brought up economic activity as a qualifier for divinity. You may like me to or actually think I hold that, but I don’t.”
>>>Another ad hoc assertion.
“God is anterior to that which is derived in every sense of the word. So any “dependency” isn’t really significant, as it just means that no other imaginable reality could be instantiated consistent with God’s nature.”
>>>No it is not in every sense of the word. I will quote you again: “Now, there is a sense in which, on my view, God depends on creation, and insofar as this is true, there is a sense in which He is not self-sufficient.”
“I repeat: this fact – that no other imaginable reality could be instantiated consistent with God’s nature”
>>>Then God’s wisdom depends on this creation.
“//I never said “the Father’s nature necessitates the Son and Spirit”.//
Well, do you or don’t you believe that? If you do, you have to deal with my inference.”
>>>I have clarified that God’s HYPOSTASIS meaningfully, in the genus of epistemology, necessitates the Son and HS.
“That since there is only one possible [idea of] reality consistent with God’s nature”
>>>Ah, I see, now you are changing. It used to be the physical temporal creation that you placed the dependency, now it is the eternal idea in God’s mind, which I have to remind you does not compel God’s nature precisely because God does not affirm that Idea of himself.
“Irrelevant.”
>>>It is not irrelevant. Your theology lines right up with Plotinus, and you may not have come to these conclusions yet, but I’m a Puritan, which means I believe the Bible teaches guilt by association.
Monuments of Idolatry are to be Destroyed in the Bible not Baptized: Duet 12:29-32, Isa 30:22, Jude 23, Exo 34:13, Duet 7:25, Num 33:52, Rev 2:14, 20 (knowingly), Gen 35:4, 2 Kings 10:22-28, 2 Kings 23: 4, 5, 6,7 ,2 Chron 23:15, Dan 1:8, 2 Kings 16:4, 10, 2 Chron 13:9, Exo 23:13, Duet 12:3,30, Josh 23:7
The purpose of this is so these religions will be forgotten and God’s people will not be ensnared by them.
Historical Examples: Chrysostom had temples of idols destroyed in Phoenicia; Constantine did not destroy the temples of the idols when he came into power and because of this Julian the Apostate was able to resurrect these idolatries. [English Popish Ceremonies page 165] You Romanists say that that you do that which the fathers have done. Yet Hezekiah breaks the brazen serpent which Moses had made. [2 Kings 18:4.]
“It seems clear to me? What faith means does not depend on what justification means.”
>>>That is a straw man though, or at least it used to be. You used to say that the temporal creation was necessary to what God means, now you are saying that the ETERNAL IDEA of creation is necessary to God’s nature, which I have already refuted by pointing out that that Idea is not affirmed by God of himself and thus places it logically outside of God’s nature.
Notice when Clark is talking about the divine persons and the ontological existence of their attributes and properties he delineates them by quoting their thought affirmations: “I am unbegtotten”, “I spirate”, etc. God does not think to himself, “I am Drake Shelton”, or “I am Ryan Hedrich”, or “I am creation”. To qualify for an attribute or property, an eternal idea must be affirmed by God of himself. I say this many times in my ST, where I define God’s attributes and properties by thought affirmations.
//Definition pertains to the genus of epistemology-the logical order. Actions pertain to historical order.//
I am the one sticking with Athanasius and the Puritans and Clark.
See Athanasius quote here: https://eternalpropositions.wordpress.com/2012/10/31/eternal-generation-a-necessity-of-nature-will-or-hypostasis/
See Owen’s dealing with this here: http://olivianus.thekingsparlor.com/theology-proper/john-owen-on-necessary-and-free-volitions-in-god
And of course here is Clark’s quote that I have given before:
Gordon Clark,
“The Christian view of things also seems to resemble a dualism: At least the world and God may be called two ‘substances’ ; neither one is the substance of the other. But actually Christianity is more successfully monistic than Neoplatonism was. God alone is the eternal substance, the independent principle’ apart from creation of the world nothing exists besides him. This underlines the essential and controversial elements of the Hebrew-Christian doctrine. First, as Creator, God is viewed, not as an undifferentiated One that produces a world by necessity, but as a living mind who with foreknowledge created voluntarily. Plotinus explicitly denied will to his One; but will is one of the most prominent aspects of the Biblical Deity.” Thales to Dewey, pg. 189